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Chasing Ghosts: On Writing Cultural 
Histories of Tax Law 
Assaf Likhovski* 
 
This Article discusses the use of arguments about “culture” in two debates about the 
imposition, application and abolition of income tax law: A debate about the transplantation of 
British income taxation to British-ruled Palestine in the early twentieth century, and a debate 
about tax privacy in late eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century Britain. In both cases, 
“culture,” or some specific aspect of it (notions of privacy) appeared in arguments made by 
opponents of the tax. However, it is difficult to decide whether the use of cultural arguments in 
these debates simply reflected some “reality” that existed prior to these debates, whether “culture” 
was actively constituted in these debates to further the specific interests of the participants, or 
whether the cultural arguments that appeared in the debates combined reflection and constitution 
in some determinable way. Using legal debates to learn something about culture, the Article 
concludes, is sometimes problematic. The Article therefore suggests an additional approach to the 
study of law and culture, one which focuses on the rhetorical level, seeking to map the ways in 
which arguments about “culture” (and related terms referring to the traditional and particular), 
appeared in tax law debates.  
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INTRODUCTION 
1. A Dybbuk 
In Jewish folklore, a dybbuk is a wandering spirit possessing a living body. I 
encountered my dybbuk in 2004 in an Israeli Supreme Court case in which my wife, 
a public interest lawyer, was involved.1  
Elazar Abu-Hatsera, also known as Baba Elazar, came from a family of 
Jewish saints, kabbalists, and miracle workers. Baba Elazar was merely one of a 
group of kabbalists and miracle workers that appeared in recent decades in Israel, 
people such as Yaakov Ifergan, known as “the X-ray” (because of his diagnostic 
powers), his brother Haim, known as “the ultrasound” (he specializes in fertility-
related blessings), and even the country bumpkin “Baba Tractor,” a farmer from a 
small village in the south of Israel who his followers claim is the messiah because 
he foresaw 9/11 and also because he had a keen ability to predict the location of 
underground water pipes in the fields he used to plow with his tractor before 
moving to his more recent career as a kabbalist.2  
 
1. HCJ 3516/04 Israel Religious Action Ctr. v. Ministry of Fin. [2004] (unreported case) (on 
file with author). 
2. See Yanir Yagna, Maatsamat Rentgen: Ha-Rav CT, Ha-Rav Ultrasound va-Ha-Boreret [A Roentgen 
Empire: Rabbi CT, Rabbi Ultrasound and the Arbitrator], HAARETZ, July 31, 2009 (discussing the Ifergan 
family); Avishay ben Haim, Mashiach al Traktor Lavan [A Messiah on a White Tractor], MAARIV, Oct. 3, 
2005 (discussing “Baba Tractor”); see generally YORAM BILU, THE SAINTS’ IMPRESARIOS: DREAMERS, 
HEALERS, AND HOLY MEN IN ISRAEL’S URBAN PERIPHERY (2010) (a study of healers and saint 
worship in contemporary Israel). 
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My interest in this story is strictly tax-related. Abu-Hatsera was a very 
successful kabbalist. Allegedly, he amassed a fortune of about $150 million by 
doling out blessings and advice to diamond merchants, bankers, and real estate 
developers. In the late 1990s, the Israeli tax authorities decided that the time had 
come to tax rabbis and other types of holy men involved in the “blessings 
industry.” The money that they were receiving, the government argued, was 
ordinary income, similar to the income received by psychologists or business 
consultants. At first Abu-Hatsera was asked to pay the tax authority an amount 
equivalent to $25 million, but then he and the tax authority settled. The rabbi was 
asked to pay a mere $5 million, part of which would be donated to charities of his 
own choosing. The settlement was the subject of a petition to the Israeli Supreme 
Court submitted by the Israel Religious Action Center (IRAC), an NGO affiliated 
with Reform Judaism, where my wife works as a lawyer.3 
In his response to the Supreme Court petition by IRAC, Abu-Hatsera’s 
lawyer, David Gliksberg, a tax professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 
used what may be called a tax law “cultural defense.”4 Abu-Hatsera’s money, said 
the lawyer, came from nontaxable gifts. These gifts were given to the rabbi so he 
would use them for charitable purposes. The characterization of the money as a 
gift was rooted in a long Jewish tradition which would be misconstrued if the 
money was to be viewed as income.5 Abu-Hatsera, said the lawyer, 
 
 
3. See Petition by the Israel Religious Action Center and Yossi Bar Moha, HCJ 3516/04 Israel 
Religious Action Center v. Ministry of Finance [2004] (unreported case) (on file with author). The petition 
was rejected by the Israeli Supreme Court; HCJ 3516/04 Israel Religious Action Center; see also Zvi Alush, 
Ha-Mekubal Elazar Abu-Hatsera: Yeshalem Mas Kamekubal [The Kabbalist Elazar Abu-Hatsera: Will Pay 
Tax], YEDIOT AHRONOT, Sept. 23, 2003. According to a newspaper report, Abu-Hatsera got paid not 
merely for his blessings but also by people who feared his curses. See Ruling of the Court of the 
Sephardi Rabbis Committee of Greater New York, June 12, 2004 [Hebrew] (on file with author); 
Natasha Mozgovaya, N.Y. Jews Accuse Be’er Sheva Kabbalist of Massive Fraud, HAARETZ (Feb. 26, 2010), 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1152485.html. He was recently killed by one of his 
followers. Yanir Yagna, Popular Kabbalah Rabbi Elazar Abuhatzeira Stabbed to Death in Be’er Sheva, 
HAARETZ (July 29, 2011), http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/popular-kabbalah-rabbi-elazar-
abuhatzeira-stabbed-to-death-in-be-er-sheva-1.375855. For a discussion of a somewhat similar tax 
controversy in Romania, see Chloe Schama, Voodoo Economics: Why Has Romania Slapped an Income Tax 
on Witches?, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.tnr.com/article/world/81989 
/Romania-witch-income-tax. For an example of an explicit tax exemption for clergymen, see Phil 
Bednar, Comment, After Warren: Revisiting Taxpayer Standing and the Constitutionality of Parsonage 
Allowances, 87 MINN. L. REV. 2107 (2003); Jacob Lewin, Orthodox Jewish Women and Eligibility for the 
Parsonage Exemption, 17 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 139 (2010). 
4. See generally ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE (2004); see also Yoram 
Shachar, Ha-Adam ha-Savir ba-Mishpat ha-Plili [The Reasonable Person in Criminal Law], 39 Ha-Praklit 78 
(1989); Menachem Mautner, Al Sekhel Yashar, Legitimatsya, Kfiya: Al Shoftim ke-Mesapre Sipurim [Common 
Sense, Legitimacy, Coercion: Judges as Narrators], 7 PLILIM 11 (1997); GAD BARZILAI, COMMUNITIES AND 
LAW: POLITICS AND CULTURES OF LEGAL IDENTITIES (2003) (discussions of the cultural defense 
and, more generally, law and culture, in Israel).  
5. On the nontaxation of gifts in Israeli tax law (following English law) see AMNON RAFAEL 
WITH SHLOMI LAZAR, MAS HACHNASA [INCOME TAX] 64–65 (4th ed. 2009) (Hebrew). 
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
846 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:3 
 
gives his blessing to his followers without asking for anything in return. 
Yet some of his followers are interested, out of their own generosity, in 
giving a gift to [Abu-Hatsera]. The gift is given out of spiritual and 
religious belief, with no relations to the blessing, which is rooted in a 
Jewish tradition that is more than a thousand (!) [emphasis in original] 
years old and which concerns the roots of the commandment of charity, 
and the essence of the relations of the rabbi and his followers . . . . 
[T]hese followers give their gifts to [Abu-Hatsera] because they rely on 
him, as their rabbi and teacher, to transfer the money to destinations and 
goals at his own discretion. As noted before, this behavior is in 
accordance with an old Jewish tradition . . . . [Abu-Hatsera] does not 
personally use the gifts received, and he leads an ascetic life, learning 
Torah and leading his followers.6  
Here was my dybbuk, the question that has haunted me ever since I 
encountered this argument: How should we view Abu-Hatsera’s cultural defense 
argument, and more generally, what exactly is the relationship of tax law and 
culture?  
Raymond Williams famously said that culture is “one of the two or three 
most complicated words in the English language.”7 The term has many meanings, 
and many academic disciplines have been using it in a variety of contradictory 
ways.8 In this Article I will use the term to designate a set of ideas, beliefs, 
symbols, values, social norms, and practices which are often unconscious, are 
relatively stable and static, and are widely shared by most members of a given 
social group.9 This social group may be large (a given society) or it may be small 
(elite lawyers). Culture, in my use of the term, is a category that is distinct from 
power.10  
 
6. Response of Respondent number 3, at 2, HCJ 3516/04 Israel Religious Action Center (on file 
with author). Note the ambiguity in the argument about whether Abu-Hatsera received the money as 
a gift or as an agent (his followers expecting him to give the money to charity rather than retain it). An 
additional ambiguity in the argument is between its descriptive and normative natures. The impact of 
this cultural argument on the Court is unclear, since the petition was rejected on other grounds. 
7. See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 87 
(rev. ed. 1983). 
8. See, e.g., A.L. KROEBER & CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, CULTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF 
CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS (1952) (cataloguing hundreds of definitions of the term); William H. 
Sewell, Jr., The Concept(s) of Culture, in BEYOND THE CULTURAL TURN: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE 
STUDY OF SOCIETY AND CULTURE 35 (Victoria E. Bonnell & Lynn Hunt eds., 1999) (on the variety 
of modern academic uses of the term); PETER BURKE, WHAT IS CULTURAL HISTORY 27–29, 103–04 
(2d ed. 2008) (on the boundaries between elite and mass culture in the writing of the history of 
culture). 
9. See generally ADAM KUPER, CULTURE: THE ANTHROPOLOGISTS’ ACCOUNT 227 (1999) 
(defining culture as a “collective cast of mind”). On the problem of identifying culture with a 
collective unconscious, see JEAN & JOHN COMAROFF, OF REVELATION AND REVOLUTION: 
CHRISTIANITY, COLONIALISM, AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOUTH AFRICA 27–30 (1991). 
10. On the difficulty of separating culture and power, see, for example, CLIFFORD GEERTZ, 
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 30 (1973) (on the relationship of culture and “the hard 
surfaces of life”); COMAROFF, supra note 9, at 22–23 (discussing the relationship between culture, 
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The Abu-Hatsera case raises interesting normative and descriptive questions 
about the relationship between law and culture. One of these questions has to do 
with the relationship of legal arguments and some cultural “reality.” What exactly 
was Abu-Hatsera’s lawyer doing? Some might see him a sincere informant, 
accurately describing contemporary and past reality—the authentic beliefs and 
practices of Abu-Hatsera and his followers (and of previous generations of 
observant Jews) regarding the nature of the money that was to be taxed (as a “gift” 
rather than as “income”). Others would say that the lawyer was a cynical inventor of 
“culture” (or, the term actually used in this case, “tradition”), constructing 
fictitious cultural differences that did not exist in reality just to serve the interests 
of his client. Finally, some might point to the fact that the categories the lawyer 
was using were not invented by him. Abu-Hatsera’s lawyer represented the rabbi 
and his followers as belonging to a traditional group which used non-Western 
distinctions between “market” transactions and the private sphere, between 
“income” and “gift.” The images used by the lawyer were part of a discursive 
formation about the non-Western/nonmodern other (Orientalism).11 This 
discursive formation was not created in the legal sphere but outside the law, in 
elite culture. The lawyer himself was, in a sense, trapped in this discourse. 
However, this discursive formation was not all powerful. In fact, it was creatively 
applied in ways that contradicted its supposed logic. In our case, rather than being 
used to legitimize the power of the modern secular state, the images were used to 
support the rabbi, Abu-Hatsera, in his quest to escape taxation.  
It is unclear which of these interpretations is the right one. Did the 
arguments made by the lawyer transparently reflect an actual reality? Was “reality” 
constructed by these arguments? Were legal discourse and “reality” inseparably 
enmeshed in each other, for example one type of culture (the discursive formation 
shared by the lawyer and the court) providing the lawyer with images about 
another type of culture (the beliefs and practices of Abu-Hatsera and his 
followers), and the legal debate in which these images appeared reshaping the 
meaning of the images by creatively using them in a way which empowered the 
“traditional” individual rather than the (supposedly oppressive) state?  
The nature of the arguments made by the lawyer is the concern of the judges 
who heard the case, but asking how exactly should we view such arguments is also 
a question that can be raised by anthropologists, and, when dealing with past 
 
hegemony and ideology). See also Ronald Grigor Suny, Review Essay, Back and Beyond: Reversing the 
Cultural Turn?, AM. HIST. REV. 1476, 1485 (2002) (on the autonomy of culture); BURKE, supra note 8, 
at 23, 77–101, 115–16 (on Marxist critiques of older types of cultural history that saw culture as 
autonomous as well as a discussion of more modern, social-construction approaches to culture). For 
an important discussion historicizing the way the category “culture” emerged in the nineteenth 
century in western discourse as distinct from other spheres of human activity, see, for example, RITU 
BIRLA, STAGES OF CAPITAL: LAW, CULTURE, AND MARKET GOVERNANCE IN LATE COLONIAL 
INDIA (2009). 
11. See generally A.L. MACFIE, ORIENTALISM (2002). 
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societies, by cultural historians.12  
2. Tax, Law, Culture 
Historians of taxation (and tax law) also face similar questions. The dilemmas 
they face are already implied in a famous passage by Austrian economist, Joseph 
Schumpeter, who said in 1918,   
The spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its 
policy may prepare—all this and more is written in its fiscal history, 
stripped of all phrases. He who knows how to listen to its message here 
discerns the thunder of world history more clearly than anywhere else.13  
Fiscal matters, including taxation, are described in Schumpeter’s passage as a 
microcosm mirroring the bigger cultural, political, and economic macrocosm. 
However, Schumpeter’s approach was actually more ambivalent. Schumpeter did 
not view taxation as merely being a passive reflection of society and culture. 
Taxation, he added, in another passage of his article, was also a “formative 
influence” or “cause” which actively shaped society (and culture).14  
Tax historians have understandably been keen to quote Schumpeter’s 
words.15 Who would not want to hear “the thunder of world history”? What about 
historians of tax law? Schumpeter warned his readers against using the history of 
law as a way of studying past societies. The conservative nature of legal forms, he 
said, meant that similar legal and constitutional terms can be used by completely 
different societies and that therefore it is “not to jurisprudence but to sociology 
that the historian . . . must turn when concerned with the interpretation . . . of 
social . . . conditions.”16 However, it seems that historians of tax law can 
overcome this problem if they study the moments immediately preceding and 
following the birth of tax laws when, presumably, there is a better fit between law 
and outside “culture.” 
Schumpeter’s view of taxation as both a “symptom” and a “cause” seems to 
relate to a major debate in modern law and society, legal history, and law and 
 
12. See, e.g., WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (James 
Clifford & George E. Marcus eds., 1986); PETER BURKE, VARIETIES OF CULTURAL HISTORY 197–
98 (1997); NATALIE ZEMON DAVIS, FICTION IN THE ARCHIVES: PARDON TALES AND THEIR 
TELLERS IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE (1987) (on the possibility of using ethnographic and 
historical sources to gain an unmediated understanding of society). On the relationship of cultural 
history and anthropology see generally ROBERT DARNTON, THE GREAT CAT MASSACRE AND 
OTHER EPISODES IN FRENCH CULTURAL HISTORY 3 (1999) (cultural history as “history in the 
ethnographic grain”). 
13. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, THE CRISIS OF THE TAX STATE (1918), reprinted in THE 
ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY OF CAPITALISM 99, 101 (Richard Swedberg ed., 1991). 
14. Id. at 100–01. 
15. See Isaac William Martin et al., The Thunder of History: The Origins and Development of the New 
Fiscal Sociology, in NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY 1, 2 (2009) (discussing the meaning of this “well-known” 
quote). 
16. See Schumpeter, supra note 13, at 132. 
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culture scholarship: the debate about the reflective versus the constitutive nature 
of law. Is law a mirror whose categories, doctrines, norms, and institutions 
passively reflect “outside” culture? Or is law a workshop in which cultural notions 
(“husband” and “wife” or “employer” and “employee”) are made by hegemonic 
actors, sometimes consciously and explicitly, sometimes not, and later trickle 
down and shape the collective consciousness of the rest of society?17  
One possible way to answer this question is to argue that the dichotomy is 
false. Law and society, or law and culture, are mutually constitutive or, to put it 
another way, law both reflects and constitutes culture. Law and culture, according to 
this approach, are both part of a single feedback loop, one which is based, 
according to Naomi Mezey, on “continuous recycling and rearticulation of legal 
and cultural meaning.”18 Sometimes the commitment to this formulation is still 
based on causation and a unidirectional vector of influence (which changes 
direction over time).19 However, sometimes the use of this formulation is meant 
to signify that it is impossible to clearly separate the two. 
In a recent article Pierre Schlag has criticized the “mutually constitutive” 
approach. The argument that law and culture are inextricably intertwined, he says, 
means that we are no longer able to say anything about the causal relationship 
between them. Dedifferentiation—collapsing the boundary between law and 
culture—entails the abandonment of any hope of explaining law using 
conventional arguments about causation.20  
People committed to a mutually constitutive approach might respond to 
Schlag’s critique by saying that this is not really a problem. They are no longer 
interested in conventional causal explanations. An alternative answer to the 
dedifferentiation problem, notes Schlag, is to “find refuge in the particular, the 
concrete, the local.” Legal historians, says Schlag, because of their professional 
commitment to particularism, accept the theoretical problem of dedifferentiation 
but assume that by looking at concrete examples the problem might go away.21 
 
17. See Christopher Tomlins, How Autonomous Is Law? 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 45, 68 
(2007) (discussing these two formulations); Christopher Tomlins, A Mirror Crack’d? The Rule of Law in 
American History, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 353 (1990) (discussing the “mirror” metaphor); Robert W. 
Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 121 (1984) (discussing the trickle-down effect); 
see also BURKE, supra note 8, at 77–101 (discussing a similar dilemma in cultural history). 
18. See Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 35, 37 (2001), for a discussion 
on the “mutually constitutive nature of the relationship” between law and culture; see also Tomlins, 
How Autonomous Is Law?, supra note 17, at 47 (“Law and society simultaneously contextualize, absorb, 
and are absorbed into each other.”). For additional discussions of the relationship of law and culture 
see Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, The Cultural Lives of Law, in LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF 
CULTURE 1–20 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 2001). 
19. See Mezey, supra note 18, at 55–57 (using the Miranda rule as an example of such a cycle of 
influence). 
20. See Pierre Schlag, The Dedifferentiation Problem, 42 CONTINENTAL PHIL. REV. 35, 36, 39–40, 
55–56 (2009). 
21. Id. note 20, at 58–59; see also COMAROFF, supra note 9, at 14 (mentioning the turn to the 
particular as one solution to the doubts about the ability of the social sciences to describe “reality”). 
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3. Two Case Studies 
It is at this point that I would like to intervene in the debate by discussing 
two concrete examples taken from my most recent research projects. The first 
example is taken from twentieth-century colonial tax history. The second example 
is taken from nineteenth-century Britain. Despite the time and space difference, 
the two examples have a common denominator. Both examples deal with the 
historical relationship of tax “law” (understood broadly to encompass 
administrative and political debates about the enactment and application of 
income tax legislation) and “culture.” As I will show in this Article, the problem of 
determining the causal relationship between law and culture does not go away 
even when we focus on concrete historical examples.  
Both projects discussed here analyze debates about the enactment of income 
tax legislation. In both debates participants suggested that income tax legislation 
should not be enacted (or should be altered or abolished) because there was a 
misfit between law and the society it was supposed to govern—a problem of  
“cultural” difference in the first example, or a problem of novelty which 
undermined “constitutional” traditions in the second example  
In both projects I ultimately encountered the same questions that were raised 
by the Abu-Hatsera case: Did the images and arguments that I found in the debates 
about legislation passively reflect some actual reality that existed “outside” law? 
Were the participants in the legal debates actively constructing false images about 
reality in order to serve their own material ends? Were they taking a set of images 
that existed outside law, but reshaping these images in new and creative ways that 
changed the meaning and impact of these images? As I will show, determining the 
exact causal relationship between law and culture is sometimes quite difficult. 
My first example is taken from early twentieth-century British-ruled 
(mandatory) Palestine. This example deals with the history of a colonial tax 
transplant—the imposition of income taxation in Palestine in the 1930s and 
1940s.22 The question that I sought to answer in this case was whether tax law is 
culturally specific. Tax law is often seen as a technical area of law. It is therefore 
conceived of as easily transferable between different societies and cultures. 
However, like any other area of law, tax law also relies on specific cultural notions: 
unconscious, widely shared ideas that change from one society to the next (such as 
the distinction between the market and the private sphere, notions about the 
nature of the family, or indeed definitions of terms like “gift”).  
In this case, I attempted to find out whether the transplantation of British 
income taxation to Palestine was influenced by perceptions of cultural difference. 
I discovered that participants in the debates about the imposition and application 
of income taxation in Palestine sometimes referred to local “culture.” This term 
 
22. See Assaf Likhovski, Is Tax Law Culturally Specific? Lessons from the History of Mandatory 
Palestine, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 725 (2010). 
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was used to designate things such as attitudes toward consumption, but it also 
referred to two law-related categories: tax morale (willingness to comply with tax 
law), and attitudes toward bribery. Cultural attributes thus relied on “legal” 
notions.  
Law and culture were not merely enmeshed in the definitions used. It is hard 
to say whether the images used by the participants in the debates reflected some 
“reality” (the actual attitudes of the local population toward consumption, tax 
compliance, and bribery) or whether the local “culture” that was described in my 
sources was a conscious construct, invented by the participants in the debates to 
further their political or administrative interests. Indeed, just like the Abu-Hatsera 
case, the participants may have relied on an existing set of (elite) cultural images 
(Orientalism) to describe another set of (nonelite) beliefs and practices, but the 
very process of the application of these images to a specific legal debate was 
changing the meaning and the actual effect of these images. 
While it is difficult to determine the exact causal relationship between law 
and culture, I discovered that other aspects of the use of cultural arguments in tax 
debates were easier to pin down. The use of cultural arguments, it turns out, was 
not uniform. Officials, politicians, and businessmen involved in the initial debates 
about the imposition of income taxation in Palestine in the 1930s and tax 
administrators involved in the application of income taxation in the 1940s argued 
that tax law had to take into account cultural differences between Palestine and 
Britain. However, other actors ignored or rejected these arguments. The lawyers 
involved in the enactment of the Palestine Income Tax Ordinance, both in 
Palestine and the Colonial Office, and the judges who interpreted the provisions 
of the Ordinance once it was enacted, assumed that income taxation was not 
culturally specific (or that there were no relevant cultural differences between 
Palestine and Britain). Thus, they did not see any problem with imposing English 
(or British-colonial) tax law on Palestine. Whatever the causal relationship 
between law and culture was, it was clear that different actors at different stages in 
the life of the law had different attitudes toward the use of cultural arguments.  
The second example discussed in this article analyzes arguments about one 
specific aspect of culture—privacy. This example is based on an ongoing research 
project of mine which deals with income tax privacy in Britain in the first two 
decades after income taxation was introduced (1799–1816).  
There is now an impressive body of social and cultural history of privacy that 
shows the gradual creation of the modern sense of privacy in the last few 
centuries. However, not everyone agrees that modernity is characterized by a 
growth in the scope of privacy. Critical histories of modernity have often argued 
that the modern era is characterized by the growing penetration of the private 
sphere by the state and by various nonstate institutions. My project asks whether 
the debates about tax privacy can tell us something about the more general history 
of modernity (as one based on a growth in the scope of privacy or conversely on a 
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decline). 
Arguments about privacy played a major role in the debates about income 
tax legislation in early nineteenth-century Britain. However, as in my first project, 
it is difficult to separate reflection from construction. Notions of privacy found in 
these debates may have simply reflected widely shared unconscious notions of 
privacy, the income tax debates being in this sense derivative of more general 
culture. Privacy may also have been a construct created in the specific context of 
tax debates to further the political and economic interests of specific actors. 
Another alternative may have been that the participants in the debates were using 
notions of privacy that did indeed exist in some “outside” culture, but the debates 
(and their impact on the creation of actual tax privacy norms in income tax 
legislation) changed these notions. The debates may have effected this change by 
giving privacy formal legal protection that did not exist before—specifically, a 
protection that shielded information about the taxpayer’s income from the 
community but not from the state, thus creating a distinction within the notion of 
privacy between relations of individuals to each other and relations between 
individuals and the state. 
Again, while it is difficult to determine the exact causal relationship between 
law and culture in the early nineteenth-century English income tax debates, other 
aspects of the debate are easier to pin down. In this case, an interesting aspect of 
the debate was the use of “constitutional” (in the English sense) arguments by the 
opponents of the income tax in support of the contention that the tax should be 
repealed as a novel innovation.  
Because the causal relation between law and “outside” culture is sometimes 
difficult to determine, I suggest in this article that, in addition to trying to decide 
whether cultural notions are merely reflected in debates about law, legal debates 
constitute cultural notions, or law and culture are mutually constitutive in some 
definable way, we can also ask an additional set of questions. These additional 
questions have to do with mapping the rhetorical use of “cultural” arguments in 
law-related debates—the way references to the traditional, the local, and the 
particular appeared in debates about tax law in different historical contexts. Some 
possible questions would be: When and where did references to “culture” first 
appear in such debates? What other terms (for example “constitution” or 
“custom”) were previously used in similar ways in such debates and when did 
“culture” replace them? Which actors (politicians? lawyers? administrators?) 
employed the rhetorical move of relying on “culture” to prevent taxation or to 
mitigate its effects? What sources were used to prove these types of arguments? At 
what stages in the life of the law (preenactment, enactment, postenactment) did 
such arguments appear? 
Such questions are not meant to discover the way law somehow 
“constructed” the category “culture” and how this category later trickled down to 
law’s outside. Categories such as “culture” were probably first created outside law 
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and only later appeared in legal debates, but I am agnostic about the primacy of 
either law or culture in creating these categories, and about the trickle-down 
process from law to its outside. Instead, I think such an inquiry might yield 
interesting jurisprudential insights about the nature of law at given historical 
moments: for example, about the way lawyers and nonlawyers viewed similarity 
and difference in various societies at various points in times, and about law as one 
of several alternative sites for discussing the nature of society (and “culture”). 
The Article has three parts. Part I discusses some approaches to the writing 
of cultural histories of tax law. Parts II and III describe my two case studies: 
Mandatory Palestine and nineteenth-century Britain. The conclusion summarizes 
the lessons that can be learned from the two specific case studies. 
I. CULTURAL HISTORIES OF TAX LAW 
The roots of cultural history can be traced back to the work of Herodotus. 
In the last two centuries, as historiography became an academic discipline and 
historical studies proliferated, many varieties of cultural history have appeared. 
Indeed, as Donald Kelley has shown, every several decades in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, a “new cultural history” school has appeared in academic 
historiography.23  
The latest “new cultural history” school appeared in the 1970s. It was 
inspired by developments in anthropology, linguistics, literary theory, and cultural 
studies, and its appearance was part of a wider trend in the humanities and the 
social sciences—“the cultural turn.” Within this approach there are many varieties: 
histoire des mentalités, microhistory, history of the everyday, New Historicism, and 
approaches inspired by cultural Marxism and the work of Michel Foucault.24 One 
major difference between all these varieties and previous phases of cultural history 
is that contemporary views of culture often define it in a more fragmented and 
contested way, see culture and politics as intertwined (culture being implicated in 
relations of power), and view cultural categories as socially constructed.25  
 
23. See Donald R. Kelley, Cultural Turns in Historical Scholarship, 8 INTELL. NEWS: REV. INT’L 
SOC’Y FOR INTELL. HIST. 91–97 (2000) [hereinafter Kelley, Cultural Turns]. See generally DONALD R. 
KELLEY, FACES OF HISTORY: HISTORICAL INQUIRY FROM HERODOTUS TO HERDER (1998) 
[hereinafter KELLEY, FACES OF HISTORY] (discussing the history of cultural history and its 
relationship to other varieties of historiography); Carl E. Schorske, History and the Study of Culture, 21 
NEW LIT. HIST. 407–20 (1990). 
24. See, e.g., THE NEW CULTURAL HISTORY (Lynn Hunt ed., 1989); HISTORIES: FRENCH 
CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE PAST (Jacques Revel & Lynn Hunt eds., 1995); BEYOND THE CULTURAL 
TURN (Victoria E. Bonnell & Lynn Hunt eds., 1999); MICHAEL BENTLEY, MODERN 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 145–7 (1999); Miri Rubin, What is Cultural History Now?, in WHAT IS HISTORY 
NOW? 80–95 (David Cannadine ed., 2004); GEORG G. IGGERS, HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY: FROM SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY TO THE POSTMODERN CHALLENGE 97–
133 (2005); BURKE, supra note 8, at 74–76. 
25. KUPER, supra note 9, at 19, 23–24, 245–47; see also Suny, supra note 10; BURKE, supra note 
12, at 183–212; BURKE, supra note 8, at 22–23, 31–33; Sewell, supra note 8; Mezey, supra note 18, at 
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What are the topics of the new cultural history? As historian Peter Burke 
once said, modern cultural historians are interested in topics such as “longevity, 
the penis, barbed wire and masturbation.”26 They focus on the daily, automatic, 
seemingly “natural” aspects of human existence, studying meanings, values, 
practices, manners, and representations that many individuals in a given social 
group share with other members of their group. This includes distinctions 
between the public and private, childhood and adulthood, proper male and female 
behavior, attitudes to the body, health and illness, madness, and death. The study 
of the unconscious and nonrational is an important aspect of many of these 
works, and cultural historians often study emotions and sensations, imagination, 
dreams, and collective memory.27  
The impact of the cultural turn on specific subfields of historiography has 
been uneven. For example, it has been argued that while diplomatic history was 
heavily influenced by the cultural turn, political history was not.28 What about legal 
history? One important influence of the cultural turn on legal history can be found 
in works written by critical legal historians in the 1980s and 1990s. Critical 
historians sought to study the collective “consciousness” of elite American 
lawyers, emphasizing the constitutive nature of law—the way in which categories 
created by legal discourse influenced society rather than reflected outside political, 
economic, or cultural forces.29  
Moving to specific subfields of legal history, one can ask what was the 
impact of cultural history on the history of tax law. Interest in the history of tax 
law has grown in the last few years.30 However, most of the recent works written 
about the history of tax law have focused on political and economic factors rather 
than on cultural ones. Fewer works have attempted to study tax law using a 
cultural rather than a political approach.31  
 
38–45 (discussing contemporary approach to the definition of culture in anthropology and cultural 
studies and the blurring of the boundary between culture and politics). 
26. BURKE, supra note 8, at 3. 
27. See, e.g., Kelley, Cultural Turns, supra note 23, at 94–97. 
28. On international history see David Reynolds, International History, the Cultural Turn and the 
Diplomatic Twitch, 3 CULTURAL & SOC. HIST. 75 (2006); see also Debate Forum, 3 CULTURAL & SOC. 
HIST. 472–95 (2006) (responding to Reynolds’ arguments); Peter Jackson, Pierre Bourdieu, the ‘Cultural 
Turn’ and the Practice of International History, 34 REV. INT’L STUD. 155, 160–61 (2008); Sewell, supra note 
8, at 48. On the impact of the cultural turn on political history see Suny, supra note 10, at 1489 
(arguing that it did not influence political history). But see Burke, supra note 8, at 105–08 (arguing that 
it did). 
29. Gordon, supra note 17, at 109. See generally William W. Fisher, Texts and Contexts: The 
Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065 
(1997) (for a discussion of some examples of the influence of varieties of cultural history, such as new 
historicism, on legal history). For a more recent discussion see Mitra Sharafi, New History of Colonial 
Lawyering: Likhovski and Legal Identities in the British Empire, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1059, 1061 (2007). 
30. See The Thunder of History, supra note 15, at 1–27. 
31. On the study of tax law and culture see generally Michael A. Livingston, Law, Culture and 
Anthropology: On the Hopes and Limits of Comparative Tax, 18 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 119, 121 
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How can the history of tax law be connected to cultural history? There are 
many possible varieties of cultural histories of tax law. I will mention here four 
(these are ideal types and they may blend in actual works): Histories of the way in 
which tax law was perceived by lay persons; the way tax law constituted culture; the 
way tax law reflected culture; and, finally, the way cultural arguments were 
rhetorically used in tax law debates. 
Histories of how tax law was perceived by culture examine the ways in which 
notions of tax law appeared in the thoughts and practices of nonlawyers. There is 
a vast sociological literature on legal consciousness which analyzes how official 
law is perceived and is experienced by ordinary people in their everyday lives.32 
The tax equivalent of this literature is the social science scholarship measuring and 
explaining tax morale—popular attitudes to taxation and tax law.33 Studies of how 
tax law was understood and viewed by lay persons in the past would be the 
historical counterpart of the literature on contemporary tax morale. Carolyn 
Jones’s work on American tax morale during the Second World War, my own 
work on Israel of the 1950s, and Nicholas Parrillo’s recent work on nineteenth-
century American property tax administration are possible examples of works 
belonging to this category.34 
The second type of study examines the way taxation (and tax law) constituted 
culture. For example, we can study the way in which taxes and the legal 
requirements associated with them (for example, bookkeeping) created a rational 
approach to economic behavior (to use Schumpeter’s words, brought the 
“calculating spirit into corners in which [it] did not dwell as yet”35). The historical 
emergence of a rational, “calculating spirit” was mostly studied by critical 
 
(2005) (discussing works dealing with tax culture, defining the term as “the body of beliefs and 
practices that are shared by tax-practitioners and policy-makers in a given society and that provide the 
background or context in which tax decisions are made.”); see also Michael Livingston, From Mumbai to 
Shanghai, with a Side Trip to Washington: China, India, and the Future of Progressive Taxation in an Asian-Led 
World, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 539 (2010). An important discussion of the way local “culture” 
was constructed in colonial income tax legislation (embedded within a wider discussion of the way law 
constructs both “culture” and “the economy”) is found in BIRLA, supra note 10, at 53–60, 96–99. 
32. For a summary of the literature see, for example, Marc Hertogh, A ‘European’ Conception of 
Legal Consciousness: Rediscovering Eugen Ehrlich, 31 J.L. & SOC. 457 (2004). 
33. For recent surveys of the social science literature see, for example, BENNO TORGLER, 
TAX COMPLIANCE AND TAX MORALE: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 64–78 (2007); 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Tax Morale Approach to Compliance: Recommendations to the IRS, 8 FLA. TAX 
REV. 599, 606–40 (2007); see also Birger Nerré, The Concept of Tax Culture, in NATIONAL TAX 
ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS 228 (Sally Wallace ed., 2001) (defining “tax culture”). 
34. See Carolyn C. Jones, Mass-Based Income Taxation: Creating a Taxpaying Culture, 1940–1952, in 
FUNDING THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE, 1941–1995: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ERA OF EASY 
FINANCE 107 (W. Elliot Brownlee ed., 1996); Assaf Likhovski, Tax Compliance and Modernity, 32 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 665 (2007); Nicolas Parrillo, Tax Administration for Profit: Its Rise and Fall in 
American States and Localities, c. 1860–1940 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also 
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 
86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987).  
35. Schumpeter, supra note 13, at 108. 
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accounting historians who have been heavily influenced by the Foucauldian 
notions of power-knowledge and of governmentality.36 Another topic examined 
by histories of tax and social constitution is, in Schumpeter’s words, the way 
taxation “determines the social structure,” for example, how general categories of 
tax law such as “taxpayers,” and more specific categories such as the distinction 
between passive and active income, came to define the political identities of social 
groups subject to taxation, spurring them to political organization and leading 
them to resist (or acquiesce to) taxation.37 In both cases, there is a strong 
assumption of a trickle-down process of the legal notions to law’s outside. 
The third type of history of tax law and culture is focused on the way tax law 
reflects culture. This approach assumes that the legal categories used by tax law 
reflect deep unconscious notions which originate outside the law. According to 
this approach, embedded within the technical details of tax law we can find 
unconscious notions about the proper relationship between individual and state, 
about the scope of rights and duties of taxpayers, and about the purposes of social 
institutions such as the family, corporations, or the market. Tax law is a 
palimpsest: the explicit black-letter rules hide cultural notions which originated 
elsewhere. One example of such an approach is Marjorie Kornhauser’s pioneering 
work on the impact on tax law of two general (and contradictory) images of 
wealth found in American culture, a negative and positive view. These 
contradictory images, argued Kornhauser, ultimately produced contradictory tax 
treatment of things such as interest income.38  
As I noted before, I believe that it is sometimes difficult to clearly decide 
whether tax law is a passive reflection of “culture” or actively constitutes it. 
Culture and law are not separate categories. Each is enmeshed within the other. 
While the second and third types of history are interested in the causal relationship 
between law and its outside, I suggest in this article a fourth category which is 
agnostic about the causal relationship between law and its outside. Just as the first 
category is focused on the way “tax law” is present in culture, the fourth category 
is focused on how “culture” (and related terms which refer to deep, widely shared, 
relatively static norms and practices) appeared in tax law. The interest is not in the 
link to an actual “reality.” Instead, the interest is in culture as a rhetorical move. 
 
36. See Peter Armstrong, The Influence of Michel Foucault on Accounting Research, 5 CRITICAL 
PERSP. ON ACCT. 25 (1994) (offering a summary and critique of Foucauldian-inspired accounting 
histories). 
37. See Schumpeter, supra note 13, at 108; see also DROR WAHRMAN, IMAGINING THE 
MIDDLE CLASS: THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF CLASS IN BRITAIN, C.1780–1840, at 108–40 
(1995). 
38. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the 
Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119 (1994); see also Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law 
and Gender Roles in the 1940s, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 259 (1988); Assaf Likhovski, A Map of Society: 
Defining Income in British, British-Colonial and American Tax Legislation, 2005 BRIT. TAX REV. 158 
(providing some other examples of attempts to describe tax law doctrines as a reflection of broader 
cultural images). 
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Possible questions of tax law history done in this mode would be: In what periods 
did arguments about the gap between taxation and the “culture” of the society 
appear? What similar terms were previously used to support such arguments? In 
what stages in the life of the law (preenactment, enactment, application) did these 
arguments appear? Who was raising such arguments (lawyers, judges, tax 
administrators, politicians)? 
Why pursue such an approach? While such an approach cannot fulfill the 
Schumpeterian goal of using taxation (or tax law) to “hear the thunder of world 
history”—that is, to use tax law to learn something about broader society (or 
culture), either as a “reality” reflected in law or as a set of categories and notions 
constructed by law and later used by society, this approach may still yield 
interesting jurisprudential insights, allowing us to ask new questions about the way 
in which law (understood as a rhetorical practice) and actors involved in this 
practice (whether lawyers or not) viewed social similarity and difference in a given 
place or period. I will return to this point in more detail in the Conclusion. Let me 
now move to the first of my two specific case studies. 
II. A COLONIAL TAX TRANSPLANT: MANDATORY PALESTINE 1917–1948 
In the early 1930s, British officials in Palestine and the Colonial Office in 
London began to contemplate the introduction of income taxation in British-ruled 
Palestine. In 1934 the Colonial Office sent a tax expert, J.F. Huntington, to the 
country. Following his visit, Huntington came to the conclusion that Palestine was 
not ready for such a tax. One of the reasons he gave had to do with a cultural 
difference between Britain and Palestine regarding outward manifestations of 
wealth: “In Palestine,” Huntington observed,  
the style of life of quite wealthy persons bears, to Western ideas, little 
relation to their income . . . . I was told on good authority that the richest 
Arab in Haifa lives in a style of penury and that a Jew of the same city, 
reputed to be a millionaire, lives in a third-rate hotel. 
Huntington then quoted a novel by the German émigré author, Arnold Zweig, 
who was living in Palestine at the time, in which it was said that  
Men who own whole districts of Jerusalem live unobtrusively among 
ancient gardens, whose existence behind high walls is more surmised than 
seen. And sheikhs, who may be observed buying costly carpets . . . look 
as though they did not possess five pounds . . . but in the end they 
produce thick bundles of notes from their pockets or from their broad 
girdles.39 
The wealthy beggars of Palestine, and the challenges that they posed to the 
British officials who were supposed to tax them, thus raise the question of the 
 
39. J.F. HUNTINGTON, REPORT ON THE INTRODUCTION OF INCOME TAX IN BRITISH-
RULED PALESTINE 12 (May 1934) (CO 733/261, TNA: PRO) [hereinafter HUNTINGTON REPORT]. 
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relationship between British tax law and local Jewish and Arab culture (culture in 
the sense that Huntington’s “style of life” was not the result of economic 
differences between locals and British taxpayers but the result of local attitudes to 
conspicuous consumption). To what extent was British colonial income tax law 
adapted to “local conditions” in the process of the transplantation of income tax 
law to Palestine?40  
1. 1917–1939: Rejecting Transplantation 
The tax system of Palestine during the late Ottoman period was mainly 
based on direct taxation of the rural population of the country. It included a 
“tithe” (called usher) that was levied on gross farm output, an animal tax (aghnam), 
and a land and building tax (werko). In addition to these taxes, the system included 
excise taxes, customs, and various registration and license fees. The British 
occupied the southern part of Palestine in 1917 and its northern part in 1918. 
During the first years of their rule in Palestine the British modified only small 
parts of the Ottoman tax system, turning customs, a favorite colonial revenue-
raising tool, into a major source of revenue.41  
The British had relatively little leeway in changing the tax system, not merely 
because they were foreign rulers to whom the local population owed weaker 
allegiance, but also because they ruled a society that was composed of two distinct 
communities, Arabs and Jews, whose social structures, economic interests, and 
political aspirations diverged widely. Any new fiscal measure would automatically 
have been seen as serving the interests of one community to the detriment of the 
other.42 
In 1923 the first British High Commissioner of Palestine, Herbert Samuel, 
appointed a commission to consider the desirability of reintroducing a Turkish 
 
40. For a summary of the theoretical literature on legal transplants, see Likhovski, supra note 
22, at 148–50. 
41. On the late Ottoman and early Mandatory tax system see ABRAHAM GRANOVSKY, THE 
FISCAL SYSTEM OF PALESTINE (1935); ARYE LAPIDOTH, EVASION AND AVOIDANCE OF INCOME 
TAX: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ENGLISH LAW AND ISRAELI LAW 16–25 (1966); Arye Lapidoth, 
Trends in the Income Tax Legislation of Israel, in SCRIPTA HIEROSOLYMITANA: VOL. 26—STUDIES IN 
ISRAEL LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 325 (1966); AMOTZ MORAG, MIMUN HA-MEMSHALA BE-YISRAEL: 
HITPATHUT U-VEAYOT [PUBLIC FINANCE IN ISRAEL: DEVELOPMENT AND PROBLEMS] 1–28 (1967) 
(Hebrew); HITPATHUT HA-MISIM BE-ERETZ YISRAEL: SKIRA HISTORIT [THE HISTORY OF 
TAXATION IN PALESTINE AND ISRAEL] (A. Mandel ed., 1968) (Hebrew); HAROLD C. WILKENFELD, 
TAXES AND PEOPLE IN ISRAEL 16–42 (1973); BARBARA J. SMITH, THE ROOTS OF SEPARATISM IN 
PALESTINE: BRITISH ECONOMIC POLICY 1920–1929, at 40–46 (1993); JACOB METZER, THE 
DIVIDED ECONOMY OF MANDATORY PALESTINE (1998); Aharon Yoran, Forty Years of Tax Law, 24 
ISR. L. REV. 738 (1990); MARTIN BUNTON, COLONIAL LAND POLICIES IN PALESTINE 1917–1936, at 
132–70 (2007). 
42. MORAG, supra note 41, at 2–3; see also Livingston, From Mumbai to Shanghai, supra note 31, 
at 570–76 (discussing the way ethnic fissures are reflected in attitudes to progressivity in 
contemporary Israel). 
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vocational tax on merchants and artisans (temettu).43 This tax had been abolished in 
1920 following the British conquest of the country, and its reimposition in 1923 
was contemplated because the British believed that the rural population was 
paying more than its fair share of taxes while urban merchants and professionals 
were lightly taxed. The High Commissioner consulted the Colonial Office in 
London, seeking information about similar taxes in the British Empire. In 
response, the Colonial Office informed Samuel of the existence of a 1922 report 
by the Imperial Inter-Departmental Committee on Income Taxation. The 
Committee created a Model Income Tax Ordinance for British colonies, a copy of 
which, apparently, was never sent to Palestine. The Colonial Office added a word 
of caution about income taxation. Because of difficulties of assessment, said the 
Colonial Office, income tax in colonies “tends to resolve itself into little more 
than a tax on Government officials, as being the only class whose income is 
readily ascertainable.”44 Following this advice, the whole matter was dropped.  
While sporadic mention of the income tax can be found in documents from 
the late 1920s, the idea of introducing income taxation in Palestine was only 
revived following the Arab riots of 1929.45 The riots led to the establishment of a 
committee composed of William Johnson, the Deputy Treasurer of Palestine, and 
Robert Crosbie, the Assistant Southern District Commissioner. They suggested 
that an income tax be introduced in Palestine, again as a way of alleviating the 
relatively high tax burden that had apparently been placed on Arab peasants.46 
In June 1932 the Government’s Standing Committee on Trade and Industry 
was instructed to examine the problem of introducing income taxation to 
Palestine.47 The renewed interest was again motivated by the desire to redistribute 
the tax burden more equitably between the rural and urban sectors, and implicitly 
between Arabs (most of whom were peasants) and Jews (most of whom were 
urban). It was also motivated by the concern, raised perhaps by the economic 
crisis of the early 1930s, that custom revenues might decrease in the future and 
that a machinery for taxing income should therefore be put in place while 
 
43. Taxation Inquiry Appointees (June 15, 1923) (CO 765/1, TNA); see also Mas Hachnasa be-
Eretz Yisrael [Income Tax in Palestine], DAVAR, Nov. 6, 1939, at 2 (Isr.). 
44. Letter from Thomas to Herbert Samuel, (Jan. 28, 1924) (CO 733/51, TNA: PRO); 
Minutes (July 21, 1932) (CO 733/225, TNA: PRO); Income Tax, PALESTINE POST, Apr. 3, 1941, at 4; 
see also GRANOVSKY, supra note 41, at 119, 209, 302–03; REPORT OF THE INTER-DEPARTMENTAL 
COMMITTEE ON INCOME TAX IN COLONIES NOT POSSESSING RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT (1922) 
[hereinafter 1922 REPORT]. 
45. See, e.g., Minutes of the Executive Council of the Government of Palestine, 183rd Meeting 
(June 27, 1927) (CO 814/23, TNA). 
46. GOV’T OF PALESTINE, REPORT OF A COMMITTEE ON THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF 
AGRICULTURALISTS IN PALESTINE AND THE FISCAL MEASURES OF GOVERNMENT IN RELATION 
THERETO 49, 56 (1930); GRANOVSKY, supra note 41, at 305. 
47. Income Tax, PALESTINE POST, Apr. 3, 1941, at 4; Sir Arthur Wauchope’s Policy, PALESTINE 
POST, Dec. 14, 1932, at 5; Extract from Daily News Bulletin No. 36 (Feb. 10, 1934) (CO 733/260, 
TNA: PRO); Income Tax Scheme: No Change in Jewish Attitude, PALESTINE POST, Feb. 16, 1934, at 8. 
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Palestine enjoyed a period of relative prosperity, so that it could be used in the 
future to replace other sources of revenue.48  
Palestine was not the first British territory in the Middle East to have an 
income tax. Income taxation was introduced in Iraq in 1927. However, in Iraq 
most taxpayers were British officials and firms.49 Income taxation was also 
introduced in Trans-Jordan in 1933.50 There too the tax was actually imposed only 
on a small group of salaried employees, with exemptions provided for many 
occupations (including workers in religious and charitable organizations, servants, 
agricultural workers, and midwives).51  
Unlike Iraq and Trans-Jordan, where the tax encountered little opposition 
from the local population, in Palestine the introduction of income taxation met 
with fierce resistance among some sectors of the population. While initially there 
was some Arab opposition to the tax, most Arab politicians and businessmen 
ultimately came to support it, provided it would be used to replace other taxes 
such as the tithe and customs, which were seen as pro-Jewish.52 
Initial Jewish reaction, at least in the politically dominant Jewish labor 
movement, was quite favorable despite the perceived adverse impact income 
taxation would have on the Jewish sector.53 However, middle-class Jews opposed 
 
48. Letter from Wauchope to Colonial Office (Dec. 22, 1932) (CO 733/225, TNA: PRO); 
Letter from Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister (June 14, 1934) (CO 733/261, TNA: PRO). 
49. One Colonial Office official who served in Iraq before moving to London noted that the 
general Iraqi view was that the income tax “should be a tax payable by British officials and British 
firms and companies, and as far as possible by no one else.” Minutes, Vernon (Apr. 30, 1934) (CO 
733/260, TNA: PRO). 
50. Income Tax in Trans-Jordan, PALESTINE POST, Mar. 21, 1933, at 2; GRANOVSKY, supra note 
41, at 324. 
51. Old Story Across the Jordan: Income Tax in Force Since 1933, PALESTINE POST, Apr. 29, 1941, 
at 3. 
52. The tithe was seen as pro-Jewish because it was mainly paid by Arab peasants. High 
customs rates were also seen as pro-Jewish because they were seen as a way of protecting young 
Jewish industries from foreign competition. On Arab support for the income tax, see, for example, 
Haifa Arabs Favour Low Income Tax, PALESTINE POST, Feb. 25, 1934, at 5. On the argument that 
income tax should replace customs, see Syrian Transport to Palestine Growing, PALESTINE POST, June 12, 
1938, at 12. On Arab opponents of the income tax, see, for example, More About Income Tax: View of 
Arab Opponents, PALESTINE POST, Dec. 5, 1932, at 5; Merchants and Proposed Income Tax, PALESTINE 
POST, Feb. 15, 1934, at 5; Proposed Election Boycott: Deprecated by Gaza Mayor, PALESTINE POST, Feb. 16, 
1934, at 8. 
53. See, e.g., Haim Arlosoroff, mi-Reshimot ha-Hodesh [Notes of the Month], 1 AHDUT HA-’AVODA 
461, 471 (1930); Ha-Vicuah al Mas Hachnasa ba-Vaad ha-Leumi [The Argument Regarding Income Tax in the 
National Council ] , DAVAR, Nov. 16, 1932; Lediyun be-Inyan Mas Hachnasa [Discussion Regarding Income 
Tax], DAVAR, Nov. 18, 1932, at 2 (speech by Berl Katznelson). For an earlier declaration of support 
for progressive income taxation by the Jewish labor movement, see Hahlatot ha-Veida ha-Shlishit shel 
Histadrut ha-Ovdim ha-Clalit be-Eretz Yisrael [Decisions of the Third Conference of the National Workers Alliance 
in Israel ] , DAVAR, Aug. 26, 1927, at 9. On the Jewish labor movement, socialist policies, and taxation 
see also ZEEV STERNHELL, THE FOUNDING MYTHS OF ISRAEL: NATIONALISM, SOCIALISM, AND 
THE MAKING OF THE JEWISH STATE 6 (1999). 
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income taxation vehemently.54 An article by Arthur Ruppin, a leading Zionist 
sociologist and economist, summarized the main arguments of the Jewish 
opponents of the tax.  
One of the major arguments that Ruppin used was based on cultural 
difference between Britain and Palestine. According to Ruppin, the tax morale and 
“economic maturity” of the native (i.e., Arab) inhabitants of Palestine would not 
allow the introduction of the income tax. Indeed, “the income tax, a product of 
long evolutionary process in Western countries, if mechanically transplanted into 
the backward conditions of Palestine, can do little good to state finance but may 
inflict serious harm on the country’s economic fabric.”55 Ruppin’s arguments were 
espoused by the National Council of Palestinian Jews (Vaad Leumi ) , one of the 
major political organizations of the Jewish community in Palestine, which, in 
December 1932, adopted an official resolution opposing taxation of income, 
arguing that  
The cultural level and economic situation of large sections of the 
country’s inhabitants prevent a fair registration of their income, giving 
rise to the danger that instead of a fair distribution of taxes, an income 
 
54. On settler resistance to income taxation in other parts of the British Empire, see Barbara 
Bush & Josephine Maltby, Taxation in West Africa: Transforming the Colonial Subject into the “Governable 
Person,” 15 CRITICAL PERSP. ON ACCT. 5, 12 (2004); Michael Littlewood, Taxation Without 
Representation: The History of Hong Kong’s Troublingly Successful Tax System, 2002 BRIT. TAX REV. 212 
(discussing the history of income taxation in Hong Kong). According to a Palestine Post article, the 
opposition to the tax in the Jewish community was universal. Income Tax Opposed: Unanimous Jewish 
Opinion, PALESTINE POST, Feb. 14, 1934, at 4; Income Tax: Impractical, Unjust, Harmful, PALESTINE 
POST, Mar. 5, 1934, at 4. 
55. Arthur Ruppin, Income Tax in Palestine: A Premature and Ill-Advised Project—Serious Menace to 
Development, 18–19 PALESTINE NEAR E. ECON. MAG. 443, 443–46 (1932). Similar arguments were 
made by other Jewish opponents of the plan. See, e.g., Letter from Dizengoff to Chancellor (Nov. 20, 
1932) (CO 733/225, TNA: PRO); Note on Discussion on the Introduction of Income Tax in 
Palestine Between the Acting Treasurer and the Jewish Agency (July 4, 1932) (CO 733/255, TNA: 
PRO); GRANOVSKY, supra note 41, at 283–300, 305–16. It should be noted that the ethnic incidence 
of taxation was hotly disputed. In a memorandum submitted to the Palestine Royal Commission in 
1937, the Government of Palestine argued that it was impossible to give an accurate figure of the 
relative incidence of taxation along ethnic lines. See Memorandum No. 4C: Relative Contributions of Arabs 
and Jews to Revenue and Benefits Derived by Each Race from Expenditure, in 2 MEMORANDA PREPARED BY 
THE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE FOR THE USE OF THE PALESTINE ROYAL COMMISSION 20–24 
(1937); see also MICHEL FRED ABCARIUS, PALESTINE THROUGH THE FOG OF PROPAGANDA 173–85 
(1946); SMITH, supra note 41, at 57; Mahmoud Yazbak, From Poverty to Revolt: Economic Factors in the 
Outbreak of the 1936 Rebellion in Palestine, 36 MIDDLE E. STUD. 93, 97–100 (2000). An additional 
argument made by other Jewish speakers was that the tax would subject capital flowing to Palestine 
from foreign countries to double taxation. See Note of Discussion with Dr. Brodetsky (Nov. 30, 1932) 
(CO 733/225, TNA: PRO). The issue of double taxation was often a cause of concern in the colonial 
context. For previous examples, see The Colonies and the Income-Tax, TIMES, June 6, 1896, at 18; 
Association to Protest Against the Duplication of Income-Tax Within the Empire, TIMES, Feb. 10, 1917, at 12; 
Double Income Tax Within the Empire: Strong Protest Against the Grave Injustice of the Present System, TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 1919, at 17. Some opponents of income taxation in Palestine also noted that Egypt and Syria, 
which neighbored Palestine to the south and the north, respectively, did not have an income tax at the 
time. Arie L. Shenkar, Why Income Tax in Palestine, PALESTINE POST, Apr. 4, 1934, at 2. 
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tax will lead to an additional burden on those sections which either do 
not desire or are unable to conceal their income.56  
While the debate on the taxation of income raged, the lawyers of the 
Colonial Office and the Government of Palestine created a draft Income Tax 
Ordinance for Palestine. This draft was based on the Model Colonial Income Tax 
Ordinance of 1922. Little attempt was made, either in London or Jerusalem, to 
adapt the Model Ordinance to local conditions.57 
If in the initial stage of drafting the Ordinance little attention was devoted to 
local conditions, it seems that the opposite was true of the second stage—when an 
expert was sent to Palestine to examine local attitudes, interests, and 
circumstances. The official who was sent to Palestine was the previously 
mentioned Board of Inland Revenue expert, J.F. Huntington. Huntington arrived 
in Palestine in February 1934 to head a committee that also included two local 
officials, the Treasurer and the Director of Customs, Excise, and Trade. 
Huntington’s committee heard evidence in March and April of 1934. Witnesses 
included members of local chambers of commerce, as well as representatives of 
major industries and the professions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, workers and 
peasants, who were an indirect although important interest group, were not 
invited to give evidence.58  
Huntington submitted his report in May 1934. His general conclusion was 
that income taxation should not be imposed in Palestine. Huntington’s rejection 
of income taxation was based on two major arguments: one having to do with the 
nonhomogeneous nature of society in Mandatory Palestine, the other with local 
social norms.  
Taxation of income, Huntington said, should target the taxpayer’s “ability” 
by reference to the taxpayer’s monetary income. Palestine, said Huntington, was a 
country of “strangely assorted standards of life,” and monetary income could not 
“furnish a fair test of ‘real’ ability in a country in which the most widely different 
cultures and standards of life are found side by side.” In Palestine, an income of 
₤500 per annum provided a high standard of living for Arabs, but “for a 
European . . . and for many Jews” such an income meant “bare livelihood,” both 
because much of the income would be spent on rent and because “many of the 
more numerous things which [the European’s and Jew’s] culture and standard of 
living have made necessary to him are heavily taxed already.” Living costs, 
 
56. Extract from Daily News Bulletin No. 36, supra note 47. 
57. This obliviousness to local conditions was perhaps a result of the recommendation of the 
committee that prepared the 1922 draft, which said in its report that the “uniformity of legislation 
should be aimed at as far as possible.” See 1922 REPORT, supra note 44, at 5; see also G. EICHELGRÜN, 
PALESTINE INCOME TAX GUIDE 2 (1945). 
58. A Low Income Tax Considered: Visiting Expert to Hear Local Evidence, PALESTINE POST, Feb. 
11, 1934, at 1. In total, the committee heard eighty-one witnesses, thirty-one of whom were Jews, and 
the rest coming from the local Muslim, Christian Arab, and Christian European communities in 
roughly equal numbers. See HUNTINGTON REPORT, supra note 39, at 35. 
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Huntington concluded, “vary according to race and creed, of necessity and not of 
choice, in a way inconceivable in occidental countries.”59 Huntington also added, 
There were such vast differences in the standard of living and morality of 
various sections of the community, that an identical rate of tax on a given 
income would be burdensome on some classes and comparatively light 
for other sections assessed at that rate e.g. a Government official earning 
₤1000 a year is a comparatively poor man and a merchant in the Souk 
earning ₤1000 a year is definitely a rich man.60  
Another set of arguments used in the report had to do with local social 
norms. Huntington noted that there would be widespread evasion of the income 
tax because of “Arab standards . . . both of truthfulness and of bookkeeping.” He 
also noted that in Palestine accountants were of poor standing and low quality, 
unregulated by any professional body, and that they therefore lacked a spirit of 
independence toward their clients. Finally, he mentioned the “engrained habits of 
bribery in an oriental country.”61 These images were echoed in a note written on 
Huntington’s report by one of the officials in the Colonial Office (who previously 
served in Iraq). This official commented that  
the Baghdadi Jew is the greatest living expert in the production of 
fictitious accounts and . . . he has a high reputation for this in 
Manchester. No doubt the Palestine Jew will have some similar 
qualifications and I should be surprised if the Palestine Arabs and 
Christians are behind him in this respect.62  
Based on Huntington’s report, the High Commissioner for Palestine reached the 
conclusion that introducing an income tax in Palestine would be impractical.63  
2. 1939–1941: Enactment 
As a result of the Arab revolt of 1936–1939 and the beginning of the Second 
World War in 1939, the revenues of the Government of Palestine declined 
sharply. The British attempted to deal with declining revenues by increasing 
import and excise duties, stamp duties, and rates on postage, telephone, and 
transportation.64 However, the decline in revenue also served as an excellent 
excuse for introducing income taxation.65 Several developments created a more 
 
59. HUNTINGTON REPORT, supra note 39, at 18, 23. 
60. Id. at 40. 
61. Id. at 8, 14, 20, 42. 
62. R. V. Vernon, Minutes (July 17, 1934) (CO 733/261, TNA: PRO). This official then added 
that such considerations should not hinder the imposition of the tax because “if you are ever going to 
introduce income tax in Palestine you will have to face this difficulty,” and the sooner it was done the 
better. 
63. Letter from Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister (June 14, 1934) (CO 733/261, TNA: PRO). 
64. Increased Taxation in Palestine: Attempt to Make Country Self-Supporting, TIMES, May 2, 1940, at 
5. 
65. Minutes of the 854th Meeting of the Executive Council of the Government of Palestine 1 
(Mar. 8, 1941) (CO 814/37, TNA). 
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favorable climate for the introduction of taxation of income in Palestine. Income 
tax had been introduced in Egypt in 1938,66 and in a number of other British 
colonies such as Hong Kong and Cyprus at the beginning of the Second World 
War.67 Palestine thus became one of the last British possessions in the Middle 
East—and, indeed, around the world—where an income tax had not yet been 
introduced by 1940, at a time when the explicit policy of the Colonial Office was 
to introduce it in all parts of the Empire.68  
In addition, the Jewish community in Palestine was already in the process of 
introducing such a tax internally. In early October 1940, the Jewish National 
Council, the governing body of the Jewish community in Palestine, decided to 
impose a voluntary progressive Jewish income tax whose revenues were to be 
used for relief work.69 The revenues collected were substantial.70  
Six days after the decision of the Jewish National Council to create a 
voluntary Jewish income tax system, the Government of Palestine announced that 
it was reconsidering the imposition of income taxation due to the expected decline 
in revenues from customs, the increase in income tax rates in Britain, and the fact 
that the burden of taxation in Palestine fell heaviest on the poor and middle 
 
66. New Tax Law in Egypt, PALESTINE POST, July 26, 1938, at 5; Egypt’s Double Peace-War 
Programme: King Farouk Officiates at State Opening of Parliament, PALESTINE POST, Nov. 20, 1938, at 1. 
Syria and Lebanon introduced income taxation only after it was introduced in Palestine. See Income Tax 
Announced in Syria, PALESTINE POST, June 18, 1942, at 3; Income Tax in Lebanon, PALESTINE POST, 
Nov. 24, 1944, at 3; G. Eichelgruen, Income Tax in Lebanon: Provisions May Affect Palestinians, PALESTINE 
POST, Mar. 14, 1945, at 2. 
67. News in Brief, PALESTINE POST, Oct. 13, 1939, at 7; Economic Position of Cyprus, PALESTINE 
POST, Jan. 24, 1941, at 5; Cyprus Income Tax and Commerce: A Possible Model for Palestine, PALESTINE 
POST, Apr. 19, 1941, at 5. On the introduction of income taxation in Hong Kong (in Apr. 1940) see 
generally Littlewood, supra note 54; Michael Littlewood, The Legacy of UK Tax Law in Hong Kong, 2008 
BRIT. TAX REV. 253. See also, BIRLA, supra note 10, at 53–60 (discussing India). 
68. Income Tax Levy for Palestine: 50 Mils in the Pound and Up, PALESTINE POST, May 26, 1941, at 
1; H.M. Government’s Colonial Policy During and After the War, PALESTINE POST, Aug. 20, 1941, at 4. 
69. Income Tax, PALESTINE POST, Oct. 3, 1939, at 6; Jewish “Income Tax” Announced, PALESTINE 
POST, Oct. 3, 1939, at 1; The Week in Comment, 4 PALESTINE REV. 341, 342 (Oct. 1939). The rates 
ranged between one percent on a monthly income of 10LP to more than twenty percent on monthly 
incomes of more than 100LP. Even before the introduction of Jewish income tax on a national level, 
there were repeated attempts to introduce a municipal income tax in Tel Aviv. For example, in 1938 
Labor councilors in Tel Aviv were joined by some homeowners who suggested that such a tax be 
imposed because they felt that they were shouldering too much of the municipal tax burden and 
because foreign companies with huge profits paid only an insignificant amount of the municipal rates. 
See Councillors in Conference, PALESTINE POST, Mar. 13, 1938, at 8. But see Councillors in Conference: Tel 
Aviv’s Budget, PALESTINE POST, Mar. 20, 1938 (suggesting that such taxation should wait for the 
establishment of a Jewish state, since taxation of income could not be successfully introduced in a 
single city); see also Municipal Budget Debate Concluded, PALESTINE POST, Feb. 12, 1941, at 3. These 
demands were not met, and no municipal income tax was created. See T[el] A[viv]Adopts LP704,500 
Revenue Budget, PALESTINE POST, Mar. 14, 1944, at 3; Municipal Elections Demanded, PALESTINE POST, 
Dec. 20, 1944, at 3. 
70. From 1942 to 1943 the government collected about LP1,000,000 in income tax, while the 
three main voluntary Jewish funds collected about LP1,200,000. See Public Works for Tel Aviv Progress: 
Town’s Debt Is Only LP390,000, PALESTINE POST, Apr. 23, 1945, at 3. 
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classes.71 An Income Tax Ordinance was enacted in August 1941 and came into 
force in September 1941.72 
This time around, the idea of a tax on income was received far more 
favorably than in the mid-1930s. Jewish chambers of commerce in major towns 
and Jewish homeowners were still opposed to the tax, but the general tone in the 
Jewish press now shifted in a more favorable direction, most likely because the 
Jews and the British were now on the same side of a world conflict that threatened 
the very existence of the Jewish community in Palestine.73 The tax, said a Palestine 
Post article, “cannot be regarded as an unjustifiable burden on the population since 
it is modest in its demands and apparently equitable in incidence.”74 Another 
newspaper, Ha-Boker, said that the new income tax commissioner was not to be 
seen as an enemy of the people, and noted enthusiastically that the new income 
tax ordinance was in “the latest European fashion.”75  
A few changes were made in the Ordinance to adapt it to local conditions. 
For example, a section dealing with “family deductions,” which originally allowed 
a deduction only for the maintenance of old or infirm family members, was 
redrafted to allow a deduction in any case in which the taxpayer proved that they 
maintained a “person incapable of maintaining himself.” The alteration, it was 
explained, was made to meet a request from Muslims who claimed that “they are 
bound by custom to maintain relatives whether or not they are old or infirm.”76 
 
71. Income Tax Again Being Considered: Government Measure to Reach All Classes in Palestine, 
PALESTINE POST, Oct. 8, 1939, at 1. The decision to introduce the tax as an experimental measure 
was actually made by the Executive Council of the Government of Palestine in early 1940. See 
Minutes of the 723rd Meeting of the Executive Council of the Government of Palestine 2 (Feb. 2, 
1940) (CO 814/36, TNA); see also Minutes of the 746th Meeting of the Executive Council of the 
Government of Palestine 3 (Sept. 14, 1940) (CO 814/36, TNA). 
72. Income Tax Law Published: In Force from September 1, PALESTINE POST, Aug. 24, 1941, at 1. 
73. Notes of the Week, PALESTINE POST, Oct. 13, 1939, at 6; Me-Inyanei ha-Shaa [Curent Events], 
DAVAR, Feb. 13, 1940, at 8; Readers’ Letters: The Urban Property Tax, PALESTINE POST, Mar. 26, 1941, 
at 4; Income Tax as Substitute, PALESTINE POST, Apr. 2, 1941, at 2; Arab Chambers Consider Income Tax, 
PALESTINE POST, Apr. 7, 1941, at 2; Our Treasury, PALESTINE POST, Apr. 22, 1941, at 4; Income Tax 
Favoured, PALESTINE POST, Apr. 22, 1941, at 3; Reflections, PALESTINE POST, Apr. 26, 1941, at 4 
(supporting the tax). But see Mas Hachnasa be-Eretz Yisrael, supra note 43; Opposition to Income Tax in 
Palestine, PALESTINE POST, Jan. 26, 1940, at 5; Objections to Income Tax, PALESTINE POST, Apr. 21, 
1940, at 2; Hebrew Daily Says Move Is Premature, PALESTINE POST, Mar. 17, 1941, at 3; Home-Owners 
Protest Against Income Tax, PALESTINE POST, Apr. 2, 1941, at 2; Jewish Merchants in Conference, 
PALESTINE POST, Apr. 16, 1941, at 3. 
74. The New Income Tax, PALESTINE POST, June 2, 1941, at 4. 
75. Mutzag ba-Muzeon le-Misim: 50 Shana le-Hanhagato shel Mas Hachnasa be-Eretz Yisrael 1941–
1991 [Tax Museum Exhibit: 50 Years to the Enactment of Income Tax in Israel 1941–1991], 19 RIV’ON 
YISRA’ELI LE-MISIM 292 (1991). 
76. Untitled Table, at 38 (CO 733/444, TNA: PRO) (Section 16 of the Ordinance); Income 
Tax Adviser Memo (May 15, 1941) (M 724/15, (3.0.1.643), ISA). For a similar argument in the case of 
Hong Kong, see Littlewood, supra note 54, at 256. See also Government Adviser’s Broadcast, PALESTINE 
POST, May 26, 1941, at 4 (comparing the use of allowances in European countries and Palestine); In 
Force, supra note 72; Income Tax, PALESTINE POST, Aug. 27, 1941, at 4 (providing summaries of 
alterations in the Ordinance following comments received from the public after the publication of the 
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However, as a general statement it is fair to say that the Ordinance was drafted 
based on the assumption of universality of income tax law.  
Evidence that these assumptions were not shared by all British officials can 
be found in a letter written by D.N. Strathie, the first Income Tax Commissioner 
in Palestine, who previously served in Madras. In a 1941 letter, Strathie suggested 
that the draft Palestine Income Tax Bill should be amended in line with a 
provision of Indian income tax law which did not grant a right of appeal to 
taxpayers who either did not file a return or failed to produce accounts and whose 
tax assessments were made independently by a tax officer. This, said Strathie, was 
“our chief weapon in forcing the production of accounts.” Such a provision “may 
appear retrograde,” but “Orientals will certainly avoid giving returns and 
producing accounts (I am sure they all have them).” In addition, said Strathie, the 
Palestinian Ordinance was faulty because it was based “too much on English 
practice.” For example, he thought that the deductions for a wife and children 
were ill-advised “in an Eastern Country.”77  
3. 1941–1948: Application 
Collection of the new income tax proved to be easier than expected, and 
initial revenues exceeded expectations.78 Not surprisingly, one prominent 
characteristic of the tax debates in Palestine was that many tax issues were viewed 
through an ethnic prism. Jewish opposition to the tax, as well as Arab support for 
it, were based on the fact that taxation of income was seen as an anti-Jewish 
measure.79 It was only when wealthy (and perhaps less nationalist) Arabs realized 
in early 1943 that taxation of income did not necessarily ease the burden of other 
taxes that they joined forces with the Jews to oppose it. In January 1943, when the 
Government announced its intention to raise income tax rates and introduce a 
new rural property tax, Jewish and Arab landlords joined ranks in opposition to 
the plan, discussing the formation of a joint conference of Arab and Jewish 
property owners.80  
Wealthy Arabs also voiced opposition to taxation when the British attempted 
to introduce an estate duty in early 1943.81 When this became known, a 
 
bill and also a list of major requests for changes in the Income Tax Ordinance which were not 
accepted); ABRAHAM FELLMAN, THE PALESTINE INCOME TAX LAW AND PRACTICE 27 (1946). 
77. Letter from Strathie to Downie (Jan. 5, 1941) (CO 733/444, TNA: PRO). 
78. Annual Progress Reports 1942–1945: Supplement to Annual Report (Apr. 15, 1942) 
(Record Group 16, M-1379/24, ISA) [hereinafter Supplement to Reports 1942–45]. The actual 
number of taxpayers, however, was lower than expected (5000 instead of 7000). Cf. 6000 out of 7000 
Taxpayers in Towns, PALESTINE POST, June 5, 1941, at 3; Income Tax Receipts Satisfactory, PALESTINE 
POST, Apr. 26, 1942, at 3. 
79. HUNTINGTON REPORT, supra note 39, at 8 (citing a PALESTINE POST editorial published 
in Mar. 1934). 
80. Landlords Meet, PALESTINE POST, Jan. 25, 1943, at 3. 
81. Palestine Pays Its Way, PALESTINE POST, Feb. 18, 1943, at 4; New Taxes on Incomes and Profits, 
PALESTINE POST, Feb. 18, 1943, at 1. 
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conference of Arab landlords and delegates attacked the tax as “contrary to the 
laws of Islam.”82 The opposition proved successful and the idea was abandoned, 
although there was another, equally unsuccessful, attempt to introduce an 
inheritance tax in 1945.83 
By 1945–46 there were 62,000 income taxpayers in Palestine, and revenues 
from the tax comprised about twenty percent of total government revenues.84 
However, government officials, while reporting an impressive increase in the 
number of taxpayers, also reported that certain social groups generally evaded 
taxation, especially Arabs and “Old Yishuv” (i.e., non-Zionist, often ultra-
orthodox) Jews.85 At least in the case of Arab taxpayers, the disappointing 
revenues may also have been the result of social structures. The Income Tax 
Commissioner observed in 1942 that “in early discussions the District 
Commissioners had anticipated large sums from rich Arab property owners. There 
has been no such case. Certain Arab families do own large extents of agricultural 
land but the income is divided up between various members of the family and has 
rarely proved taxable.”86 
In the process of adapting the Ordinance to local conditions, British officials 
made use of various mechanisms. One was to give discretion to local experts.87 
For example, one popular method of tax avoidance in Palestine was the formation 
of companies and the retention of profits by the companies (the maximum initial 
tax rate on individuals was thirty percent, while the rate of taxation on companies 
was initially set at ten percent).88 One way to fight the use of companies as a tax 
avoidance device was by taxing undistributed profits. Section 22(1) of the Income 
Tax Ordinance, which contained a general anti-avoidance provision, was expanded 
in April 1943 to include specific provisions taxing undistributed profits. A 
committee was created, which had a majority of nonofficial members (two 
 
82. All-Palestine Arab Conference Rejects Tax Proposals, PALESTINE POST, Mar. 12, 1943, at 3. 
83. New Income Tax in Force Tomorrow, PALESTINE POST, Mar. 31, 1943; Landlords’ Opposition, 
PALESTINE POST, Mar. 11, 1945, at 2; War Tax on Companies Enacted, PALESTINE POST, July 29, 1945, 
at 3. 
84. How Jewish Taxpayers Outnumber Arab, PALESTINE POST, Mar. 23, 1948, at 3; MORAG, supra 
note 41, at 10. 
85. Annual Progress Reports 1942–1945: Income Tax—General Report for 1942–43, at 2 
(Record Group 16, M-1379/24, ISA) [hereinafter Income Tax General Report 1942–43]. 
86. Supplement to Reports 1942–45, supra note 78, at 2. 
87. The use of lay experts to assess and collect income, thus reducing friction between the 
state and taxpayers, was a well-known device used, for example, in the determination of the profits of 
unincorporated businesses in England. See MARTIN DAUNTON, TRUSTING LEVIATHAN: THE 
POLITICS OF TAXATION IN BRITAIN, 1799–1914, at 186, 188, 190 (2001); see also Margaret Lamb, 
‘Horrid Appealing’: Accounting for Taxable Profits in Mid-Nineteenth Century England, 26 ACCT. ORGS. & 
SOC. 271, 288 (2001); BUNTON, supra note 41, at 162–69. 
88. Annual Progress Reports 1942–1945, Jerusalem District: Revenue Report for the Financial 
Year Ending March 31, 1942, at 7 (Record Group 16, M-1379/24, ISA); Annual Progress Reports 
1942–1945: Annual Report 1943–1944¸ at 3 (Record Group 16, M-1379/24, ISA); 800 New Firms in 
Six Months, PALESTINE POST, July 1, 1942, at 2; see also MORAG, supra note 41, at 97. 
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officials and three members of the public with special commercial experience) to 
advise the Income Tax Commissioner on the exercise of his power under the 
section. This attempt to “introduce responsible members of the public as 
advisers,” noted the commissioner, has proved “a conspicuous success.”89 
A different way of adapting the Ordinance to local conditions was simply to 
ignore the letter of the law in its application.90 For example, requests for relief in 
respect of income taxation paid in other parts of the empire were dealt with, 
despite the fact that there was no formal reciprocal mechanism of the kind 
envisioned by the Ordinance. In his 1942 Report the Commissioner noted that “I 
gave relief in some cases in which it was not strictly speaking due, as reciprocating 
arrangements have not yet been made with the colonies,” explaining that “in war 
conditions I considered it undesirable to delay relief till reciprocating 
arrangements were completed.”91  
Another example of the discretion used was in the treatment of evasion. In 
the report for 1942–43, the Commissioner noted that evasion was fairly 
widespread, but “having regard to the fact that income tax has been but recently 
introduced in Palestine, it was decided, as a matter of policy, not to take any action 
under sections 66 and 67 of the Ordinance which provide for penalties for the 
making of incorrect returns and fraudulent acts.”92  
While the officials administrating the Income Tax Ordinance tried in various 
ways to adapt the Ordinance to local conditions, legal actors, both lawyers and 
judges, were working in the opposite direction, seeking to eliminate the differences 
between Palestinian and English (and British-colonial) income tax laws. Legal 
textbooks and case law were both used to achieve this goal. The Income Tax 
Ordinance spawned an impressive number of textbooks and commentaries during 
the final seven years of British rule in Palestine.93 Many of these books contained 
 
89. Annual Report 1943–44¸ supra note 88, at 3; see also Income Tax Panel, PALESTINE POST, 
28, 1944, at 2; S. MOSES, THE INCOME TAX (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE 1943, at 31 (1943); S. 
MOSES, THE INCOME TAX ORDINANCE OF PALESTINE 77 (1944). In February 1944, the High 
Commissioner issued a notice naming twelve nonofficials to the panel. These included three English, 
four Jewish, and five Arab “members of the public.” 
90. The use of extensive discretion also characterized tax administration in England in the 
nineteenth century. See Margaret Lamb, Defining “Profits” for British Income Tax Purposes: A Contextual 
Study of the Depreciation Cases, 1875–1897, 29 ACCT. HIST. J. 105, 121, 123 (2002). 
91. Supplement to Reports 1942–45, supra note 78, at 2. 
92. Annual Progress Reports 1942–1945: Income Tax—General Report for 1942–43, at 2 
(Record Group 16, M-1379/24, ISA). Deviations from the letter of the law were not always in favor 
of the taxpayer. For example, it seems that while the Income Tax Ordinance required assessing 
officers to refund any amount that was deducted at the source in excess of the amount of tax due, the 
actual practice instead was not to refund these amounts, but to carry them over to future years, in 
direct contravention of section 61 of the Ordinance. Letter from Berinson to Comm’r of Income Tax 
(July 21, 1946) (Record Group 16, M-151/38, ISA). 
93. See A.M. APELBOM & B. BRAUDE, PALESTINE INCOME TAX CASES (1945); 
EICHELGRÜN, supra note 57; FELLMAN, supra note 76; E.W. KLIMOWSKY, MAS HACHNASA BE-
ERETZ YISRAEL [INCOME TAX IN PALESTINE] (1941) (Isr.); S. MOSES, THE 1947 INCOME TAX 
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systematic discussions of the Ordinance.94 Lawyers were also busy comparing the 
law of Palestine to English and colonial income tax law in newspaper articles.95 
Typically lawyers called for greater similarity between Palestinian and English 
law.96 Case law was another method of convergence of laws. Unlike other 
Mandatory ordinances, the Palestine Income Tax Ordinance did not contain a 
specific provision requiring judges to interpret it on the basis of English law. 
British judges in Palestine at first declared that they would not use English tax law 
in their decisions, but they soon turned to English decisions, even if they were not 
formally obliged to do so, because lawyers arguing the cases before them used 
English precedents, and the judges felt the need to address these precedents.97  
4. Tax Transplants and Culture 
Arguments about cultural difference appeared in debates about taxation in 
Palestine. In these debates, “culture” and some related terms (“morality,” “habits,” 
“custom”) were used to refer to literacy, bookkeeping practices, attitudes toward 
conspicuous consumption and standards of living, social norms about family 
obligations, tax morale, and attitudes toward telling the truth and bribery.  
Cultural arguments were used by Jewish opponents of income taxation in the 
1930s in their attempt to prevent the imposition of income taxation, but the use of 
cultural arguments was not confined to Jewish politicians. J.F. Huntington, the 
Board of Inland Revenue official sent to Palestine in 1934, echoed the cultural 
arguments made by Jewish opponents of the income tax, talking about matters 
such as Jewish and Arab standards of living, “morality,” “standards of 
truthfulness,” and the “engrained habits of bribery in an oriental country.” 
Perhaps the arguments made by Arab landlords when the British attempted to 
introduce an estate duty in early 1943, that such a tax was “contrary to the laws of 
Islam,” belong in the same category. 
It may be the case that the images used in the debate reflected widely shared 
 
AMENDMENTS (1947); S. MOSES, THE INCOME TAX ORDINANCE OF PALESTINE (1942); S. MOSES, 
THE INCOME TAX (AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 1942 (1942); S. MOSES, THE INCOME TAX 
(AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE 1943; S. MOSES & WALTER SCHWARZ, THE INCOME TAX 
ORDINANCE OF PALESTINE (2d ed. 1946); S. MOSES, THE 1947 INCOME TAX AMENDMENTS (1947); 
D. ROSOLIO & E.W. KLIMOWSKY, MAS HACHNASA BE-YISRAEL [INCOME TAX IN PALESTINE] 
(1944) (Isr.); F.H. STRAUSS, THE A B C OF INCOME TAX IN PALESTINE (1941). 
94. See, e.g., Preface to STRAUSS, supra note 93; MOSES, THE INCOME TAX ORDINANCE OF 
PALESTINE 3–8 (1942); Guide to Income Tax, PALESTINE POST, July 2, 1942, at 4; Introduction to 
EICHELGRÜN, supra note 57; FELLMAN, supra note 76, at 23–26; ROSOLIO & KLIMOWSKY, supra note 
93. 
95. See, e.g., E.W. Klimowsky, Cyprus Income Tax and Commerce, PALESTINE POST, Apr. 19, 
1941, at 5; S. Moses, Tax on Undistributed Profits, PALESTINE POST, Oct. 27, 1942, at 2; Readers’ Letters: 
Tax on Bonus Shares, PALESTINE POST, Mar. 24, 1943, at 4; S. Moses, The Future of Income Tax, 
PALESTINE POST, Jan. 10, 1944, at 4. 
96. Readers’ Letters: Income Tax, PALESTINE POST, Nov. 23, 1944, at 4. 
97. For a detailed discussion, see Likhovski, supra note 22, at 759–61. 
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attitudes that did exist in “reality.” Indeed, it is possible to argue that the potency 
of the cultural arguments used by the Jews to convince the British that income tax 
should not be imposed in Palestine is found in the fact that these arguments 
resonated in some way with an actual reality that was familiar to British officials. 
After all, why would Huntington change his mind about the desirability of income 
taxation once he reached Palestine? And more generally, why would the British 
agree not to impose a tax which, it seems, was in their interest to impose? 
There are two problems with the “resonance” argument. First, it assumes 
that cultural arguments were indeed potent. But it is impossible to know from the 
sources whether this was the case. Cultural arguments never appeared alone. They 
were always accompanied by other, noncultural arguments, and it is difficult to tell 
which arguments, the cultural or noncultural ones, actually motivated the action of 
British officials. Second, the “resonance” may not have been with reality but with 
an orientalist discourse about reality that Ruppin and Huntington shared with 
other elite actors in the debates.  
It seems that it is difficult to choose between an approach which sees the tax 
debates as a neutral and passive reflection of local “culture,” and an approach 
which finds in the debates evidence for the construction (conscious or 
unconscious) of a misleading representation of this local “culture.” It may indeed 
be the case that the cultural arguments made by Jews, British, and Arabs reflected 
in some way attitudes that actually existed in Palestine. But perhaps the “cultural 
difference” argument had little relation with some outside reality. It may have 
simply been one argument in an arsenal of arguments utilized to prevent the 
imposition of undesirable taxes and justify the selective application of these taxes 
by administrators once they were enacted. 
III. TAX PRIVACY: ENGLAND 1799–1816 
1. The History of Tax Privacy as a History of Culture  
One of the sections of Jeanette S. Martin and Lillian H. Chaney’s book 
Global Business Etiquette deals with the subject of “small talk or chitchat.” The 
section includes a long list of dos and don’ts (“when conversing with Italians, 
avoid making comments about the Mafia, Italian politics, taxes and religion,” and 
“in Australia and New Zealand . . . avoid bringing up treatment of the Aborigines, 
kangaroo population control, or labor disputes”). One of the observations made 
in this section is that “the Chinese feel it is acceptable to ask personal questions 
about salary and marital status which would be viewed as inappropriate by U.S. 
persons.”98 
 
98. JEANETTE S. MARTIN & LILLIAN H. CHANEY, GLOBAL BUSINESS ETIQUETTE: A GUIDE 
TO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND CUSTOMS 130, 132 (2006); see also FARID ELASHMAWI, 
COMPETING GLOBALLY: MASTERING MULTICULTURAL MANAGEMENT AND NEGOTIATION 28, 
197 (2001) (opining that one should not ask Americans or the French about their salary). 
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Different national cultures seem to have (at least according to this type of 
popular business ethnography) different attitudes on the privacy of information 
about individual wealth and income. Such attitudes also change over time. What is 
considered “private” at one point in time is not necessarily what will be considered 
“private” at another point.  
Many modern income tax systems protect the information that taxpayers 
provide to the tax authorities from disclosure to the general public and even from 
disclosure to other government agencies.99 However, historically, not all tax 
systems protected tax privacy. In the United States, there were periods in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when some of the federal income tax 
information provided by taxpayers to the Internal Revenue Service was made 
public, and even today some states allow limited access to information about 
property and income tax payments by corporate and individual taxpayers.100 In 
1950s Israel, the Government published a register of taxpayers’ annual income 
(sefer nishomim) listing the reported income of taxpayers so that those taxpayers 
who underreported their income would be revealed and be subject to shaming.101 
Until 2004, the Japanese tax office published the names, addresses, and tax liability 
of taxpayers whose income exceeded a certain amount. Similar practices appeared 
(and sometimes still exist) in a number of other jurisdictions.102 Thus, what seems 
 
99. There is a distinction between tax confidentiality, which is the right to require that the tax 
authorities not disclose information revealed by the taxpayer to third parties, and tax privacy, or 
secrecy, which is the right of the taxpayer not to reveal information to the authorities. This Article will 
use the term “tax privacy” to refer to both privacy and confidentiality. For the distinction, as well as a 
detailed discussion of contemporary UK confidentiality provisions, see Robert Mitchell, Confidentiality 
and the Law of Taxation, in UK LAW FOR THE MILLENNIUM 354–444 (John W. Bridge ed., 2d ed., 
London: UKNCCL, 1998). For a discussion of the relevant U.S. provisions, see Paul Schwartz, The 
Future of Tax Privacy, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 883 (2008).   
100. See REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. 94-266, 825–1135 
(1975); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing of Tax Information Increase 
Compliance?, 18 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 95 (2005); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Shaping Public Opinion and the 
Law in the 1930s: How a ‘Common Man’ Campaign Ended a Rich Man’s Law, 73 LAW & CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 123 (2010); David Lenter et al., Public Disclosure of Corporate Tax Return Information: 
Accounting, Economics and Legal Perspectives, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 803, 807–11 (2003); Richard D. Pomp, The 
Disclosure of State Corporate Income Tax Data: Turning the Clock Back to the Future, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 373 
(1993); Schwartz, supra note 99. 
101. See Likhovski, supra note 34, at 665. 
102. See HAROLD C. WILKENFELD, TAXES AND PEOPLE IN ISRAEL, at xiv (1973) (discussing 
the publication of taxpayer returns in Israel, Japan, and Sweden); Schwartz, supra note 99, at 888–89 
(discussing Italy); Lenter et al., supra note 100, at 811–12 (discussing public access to corporate tax 
returns in Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Finland as well as attitudes to the publication of tax evasion 
information in other countries); Ian MacDougall, That’s Rich: Norway’s Tax List Reveals Everyone’s 
Wealth, THE SCOTSMAN (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://news.scotsman.com/ world/That39s-rich-
Norway39s-tax-list.5760129.jp (discussing Norway); Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. 
Rasmusen, THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE BAR: LEVELS AND 
DETERMINANTS OF ATTORNEY INCOMES, Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and 
Business discussion paper no. 559, available at http: //www.law.harvard.edu/programs /olin_center/. 
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natural to some—the “right” of taxpayers not to have their income tax 
information revealed to fellow taxpayers—is actually the outcome of a specific 
historical trajectory.103  
There are many possible questions to ask once one realizes that tax privacy is 
a contingent historical phenomenon: How did income tax information become 
secret in specific jurisdictions? What arguments were used to justify tax privacy? 
Who opposed and who supported tax privacy? How did the specific contours of 
tax privacy reflect changing notions of citizenship and of the power of the state? 
The question that is most pertinent to the current article, however, is whether the 
history of tax privacy can be linked to the broader cultural history of privacy and, 
even more broadly, to debates about the nature of modernity.104 There are two 
contradictory ways of linking the history of tax privacy to the broader story. 
One way to view the appearance of the notion of tax privacy is to see it as 
one manifestation of a more general trend—the history of a gradually emerging 
private sphere, protected from the prying eyes of society and state. Such a history 
might also link the notion of tax privacy to the wider story of the rise of individual 
identity, based on an “inner” essence of the individual whose core beliefs were to 
be protected from state intervention by a series of legal and constitutional 
safeguards.105  
There is a now a sizeable body of studies by social and cultural historians (as 
well as by historical sociologists) of the history of privacy in the early modern and 
modern periods. These studies examine sites such as politics and the economy, 
architecture, print culture, the family, and sexual behavior, attempting to trace 
changing notions of privacy.106 While some of these works question the notion of 
 
103. In this Article I examine privacy issues related to individuals, not corporations. Of 
course, the need to choose between privacy and transparency also exists in the corporate sphere, and 
it seems that similar debates appeared there. See generally A.C. Storrar & K.C. Pratt, Accountability vs 
Privacy, 1844–1907: The Coming of the Private Company,10 ACCT. BUS. & FIN. HIST. 259 (2000). 
104. A few aspects of the history of tax privacy in the Anglo-American world have already 
been studied. See Chantal Stebbings, The Budget of 1798: Legislative Provision for Secrecy in Income Taxation, 
1998 BRIT. TAX REV. 651 (1998) (discussing the initial stages in the emergence of tax privacy in late 
eighteenth-century England); REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES, supra note 100 (a major 
study of American tax administration which contains a chapter briefly discussing milestones in the 
history of American tax privacy); Kornhauser, Shaping Public Opinion, supra note 100 (an important 
study that analyzes the debates surrounding attempts to make American tax returns public in the 
1930s). However, the existing works do not attempt to link the specific history of tax privacy to the 
broader historical context, especially to the burgeoning literature on the cultural history of privacy. 
105. See DROR WAHRMAN, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN SELF: IDENTITY AND CULTURE 
IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND (2004) (suggesting that late eighteenth-century England 
witnessed a major transformation in the notions of self-identity. It was during this time that 
conception of self-identity as something rigid, static, unitary, essentialist, and internal replaced a more 
dynamic, shallower, and more malleable notion of identity that existed before the late eighteenth 
century). See also LORRAINE DASTON & PETER GALISON, OBJECTIVITY 191–251 (2007) (discussing a 
somewhat similar transition in the images of “the scientific self” ). 
106. For examples of histories of privacy, see A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: (5 vols., 
Phillippe Ariès, et al. eds., 1998); PATRICIA MEYER SPACKS, PRIVACY: CONCEALING THE 
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a linear and progressive growth in the scope of privacy, the scholarly consensus 
seems to see a more or less unidirectional emergence of a comprehensive, modern 
notion of privacy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.107  
This approach is also echoed in the literature on the emergence of a legal 
notion of privacy, which has been studied by David Seipp and, more recently, 
Lawrence Friedman.108 Seipp and Friedman explore in great detail the emergence 
of the legal right to privacy in nineteenth- and twentieth-century America, 
focusing mostly on the protection of reputation and describing a host of common 
law legal tools designed to safeguard individual reputations in private law contexts, 
for example, analyzing the use of the torts of libel, slander, and invasion of 
privacy. Their work mainly focuses on American law in the nineteenth century, 
and pays less attention to an older site—English law in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century. In addition, Seipp and Friedman are mostly interested in 
tort law, rather than areas of public law, such as taxation, where legal notions of 
privacy seem to have appeared first.109 
A second, opposite way to tell the history of tax privacy would be to analyze 
the emergence of tax privacy in relation to the history of the modern state. 
Conventional accounts of the modern era often associate modernity with the 
appearance of a host of intrusive practices by the state and by nonstate institutions 
(for example, mental hospitals). Modern individuals are far more exposed than 
 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY SELF (2003); DAVID VINCENT, THE CULTURE OF SECRECY: BRITAIN, 
1832–1998 (1998); Sarah Toulalan, Private Rooms and Back Doors in Abundance: The Illusion of Privacy in 
Pornography in Seventeenth Century England, 10 WOMEN’S HIST. REV. 701 (2001). 
107. The interest in the rise of the modern notion of the private sphere can be traced back to 
Habermas’s work. See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 27–31 (1991). For 
surveys of the literature that also criticize the clear binary distinction between the private and public as 
well as the notion of a smooth linear emergence of the concept of privacy, see MICHAEL MCKEON, 
THE SECRET HISTORY OF DOMESTICITY: PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND THE DIVISION OF KNOWLEDGE 
(2005); AMANDA VICKERY, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: AT HOME IN GEORGIAN CULTURE 25–27 
(2009); Dena Goodman, Public Sphere and Private Life: Toward a Synthesis of Current Historiographical 
Approaches to the Old Regime, 31 HIST. & THEORY 1 (1992); Tim Meldrum, Domestic Service, Privacy and the 
Eighteenth-Century Metropolitan Household, 26 URB. HIST. 27 (1999). 
108. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, GUARDING LIFE’S DARK SECRETS: LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
CONTROLS OVER REPUTATION, PROPRIETY, AND PRIVACY (2007); DAVID J. SEIPP, The Right to 
Privacy in American History, in HARVARD PROGRAM ON INFORMATION RESOURCES POLICY REPORT 
P-78-3, 1978. 
109. Current histories of the right of privacy argue that this right emerged only in the mid or 
late nineteenth century. According to David Seipp, it is not possible to talk about a general legal right 
of privacy before the late nineteenth century, because the infringement of individuals’ privacy by 
other individuals was dealt with by nonlegal tools, and the infringement of privacy by the federal 
government was limited to specific issues such as the post and the census. Seipp’s account does 
contain a brief discussion of privacy and early American income taxation noting that some of the 
opposition was based on the grounds that it was inquisitorial. See Seipp, supra note 108, at 51. For the 
argument that the emergence of the private and public, and, in consequence, the appearance of the 
very notion of privacy, is intimately connected to the appearance of the tax state, see Schumpeter, 
supra note 13, at 103. 
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were people in previous generations to practices designed to collect information 
about them and thus indirectly control their lives; indeed, the argument is that 
these practices shaped their very being.110 Modern taxation, which necessitates 
“fiscal anthropometrics”—the collection of information about taxpayers on a vast 
scale—is sometimes described as a perfect example of the intrusive information-
gathering nature of modernity.111 Thinking about the history of tax privacy in this 
context would lead to a view of the notion of tax privacy as an active tool of 
political resistance to the growing power of the state rather than being merely a 
passive reflection of wider cultural trends. The appearance of tax privacy 
arguments can be used as proof that the history of modernity is not a story about 
the growing power of the state to penetrate ever deeper into the private affairs of 
the subjects, but instead a story of resistance and conflict: modern income taxation 
entailed far more penetration into the private affairs of the taxpayers. However, 
this novel attempt by the state to exercise more power over its subjects did not go 
unanswered. Taxpayers reacted to state penetration by inventing the notion of 
privacy. The state was not free to collect information or, by “knowing” its 
subjects, free to force them to comply with taxation. Instead, state attempts to 
penetrate the private sphere were resisted by an emerging middle class, who 
managed to obtain important concessions from the state guaranteeing their 
privacy.  
So should we view the history of tax privacy merely as a passive reflection of 
wider unconscious cultural notions or was tax privacy a tool consciously forged to 
fight the growing power of the state? This is the dilemma that animates the case 
 
110. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977); MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE 
DEFENDED”: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1975–1976 (David Macey trans., 1997); 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE 
FRANCE, 1977–1978 (Graham Burchell trans., 2009); Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE 
FOUCAULT EFFECT 87 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991); Colin Gordon, Governmental Rationality, in 
THE FOUCAULT EFFECT 1, 9–11; Pasquale Pasquino, Theatrum Politicum: The Genealogy of Capital, in 
THE FOUCAULT EFFECT 105, 109–10; Christopher Tomlins, Framing the Fragments. Police: Genealogies, 
Discourses, Locales, Principles, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE: THE POLICE POWER IN DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 248 (Markus Dubber & Mariana Valverde eds., 2006). For somewhat similar 
ideas, see NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING PROCESS (Eric Dunning et al. eds., Edmund Jephcott 
trans., Blackwell Publishers Ltd. rev. ed. 2000) (1939); JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW 
CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998). See also JOHN 
BARRELL, THE SPIRIT OF DESPOTISM: INVASIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE 1790S (2006) (discussing 
growing state intervention and (political) control of the private sphere and the history of privacy in 
late eighteenth-century England). 
111. See Yanni Kotsonis, “Face-to-Face”: The State, the Individual, and the Citizen in Russian 
Taxation, 1863–1917, in 63 SLAVIC REV. 221, 234 (2004). Some aspects of the story do not seem to fit 
this approach to the relationship of income taxation and modernity. Margaret Lamb for example, has 
argued, based on an impressive analysis of the income tax appeal of the author Thomas Carlyle in 
1855, that as late as the 1850s, English tax appeals were conducted in a way reminiscent of the older 
premodern “sovereign power” phase of governing and that there were only a few indications at this 
time of the emergence of self-disciplining calculable subjects. See Lamb, supra note 87. 
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study discussed in this part of the Article.  
My discussion will proceed in the following way: I will first give a brief 
outline of the history of tax privacy in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-
century Britain. Second, I will discuss the reaction of English taxpayers to income 
taxation by showing how contemporary observers perceived income taxation as 
administratively (rather than substantively) novel because of power that was given 
to the state to collect information about the financial affairs of English subjects. 
Third, I will discuss taxpayers’ resistance to the attempt to collect information 
about them, focusing on the argument made by some opponents of the tax that it 
established an “inquisition,” which undermined a “constitutional” protection from 
state intrusion. Finally, I will ask what this specific case study can tell us about the 
possibility of using the history of tax law debates in writing more general cultural 
histories of privacy.  
2. The Early British Income Tax and the Notion of Privacy  
Income taxation first appeared in Renaissance Italy and taxes on income 
were also known in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century France and the 
Netherlands, but the modern history of income tax legislation begins in late 
eighteenth-century Britain.112 In January 1798, in the fifth year of England’s war 
with France, Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger reformed the existing 
system of British taxation by introducing the Triple Assessment.113 The Triple 
Assessment unified a long series of taxes on male servants, carriages, houses, 
windows, lights, dogs, clocks, and watches (the “assessed taxes”) into a single 
system taxing luxury goods that could serve as markers of wealth.114 Income 
appeared in the Triple Assessment in the part dealing with exemptions. The Triple 
Assessment divided taxpayers into categories according to presumed income. The 
assessments of each category varied according to a specific schedule of rates. 
Taxpayers could request an exemption or abatement according to their “annual 
income.”115 The Triple Assessment failed to raise the expected revenue, and a year 
later Prime Minister Pitt proposed a new tax—the first English income tax—
 
112. See generally PETER HARRIS, INCOME TAX IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS: FROM THE 
ORIGINS TO 1820 (2006). See also Likhovski, supra note 38. 
113. An Act for Granting His Majesty an Aid and Contribution for Prosecution of the War, 
1798, 38 Geo. 3, c. 16 (Eng.); see also WILLIAM KENNEDY, ENGLISH TAXATION, 1640–1799, at 169 
(London, G. Bell and Sons Ltd. 1913) (1964); Likhovski, supra note 38, at 160–64; HARRIS, supra note 
112, at 384–85.  
114. On the triple assessment as a proxy for a property tax, see Harris, supra note 112, at 384. 
Other items previously assessed included, for example, hair powder and dogs. See, e.g., EDWARD 
BOSWELL, THE CIVIL DIVISION OF THE COUNTY OF DORSET 36–37 (Dorchester, Weston, Simonds, 
& Sydenham, 2d ed., corr., augm., and improved., 1833); B. E. V. SABINE, A HISTORY OF INCOME 
TAX 20 (1966). On the dog tax, see, for example, Lynn Festa, Person, Animal, Thing: The 1796 Dog Tax 
and the Right to Superfluous Things, 33 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LIFE 1 (2009).  
115. 38 Geo. 3, c. 16, § 4 (Eng.); see also Harris, supra note 112, at 384. 
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which came into force on January 9, 1799.116 Now all taxpayers, not just those 
seeking exemption or abatement, were to make a declaration as to their income.117 
As tax historian Chantal Stebbings has noted, there are two types of 
disclosure that can be created by the income tax. One type is the disclosure of 
private financial circumstances to government officials who are supposed to assess 
the taxpayers. The other type is the disclosure of private financial circumstances to 
the public.118 Although Pitt believed that disclosure to government officials was 
inevitable, he tried his best to convince opponents of the tax that taxpayer 
information would not leak to the general public. A number of devices were 
employed to prevent such leakage: the tax was administered by propertied 
commissioners whose wealth would guarantee their respectability, and therefore 
would prevent the leakage of information (a personal estate worth at least ₤10,000 
was the minimum property requirement of commissioners in the counties); special 
bodies to deal with commercial income were appointed; oaths of secrecy were 
required; general rather than specific returns were demanded (that is, declarations 
of income would not include any specific details of the income of the taxpayer, the 
taxpayer being merely asked to declare a sum which represented no less than ten 
percent of his income); and the returns were sealed and tax officials used a code to 
hide the names and income of specific taxpayers.119 
Because the income tax did not yield the expected revenue, Pitt attempted to 
amend it, putting forward in April 1800 a bill that would have eliminated many of 
the secrecy provisions found in the earlier acts; for example, the bill required 
taxpayers to provide detailed rather than general returns and limited the scope of 
authority of the commercial commissioners. However, opposition in Parliament 
resulted in a far weaker bill being enacted which had little effect on the existing 
scope of secrecy.120  
In 1802, following the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens, the 1799 income 
tax was abolished. It was reintroduced in 1803 by Henry Addington (who replaced 
Pitt as prime minister between 1801 and 1804). Addington retained some of the 
measures that Pitt enacted. However, he also introduced the use of a scheduler 
system, which allowed taxpayers to submit different returns based on different 
 
116. An Act to Repeal the Duties Imposed by an Act, Made in the Last Session of Parliament, 
for Granting and Aid and Contribution for the Prosecution of the War; and to Make More Effectual 
Provision for the Like Purpose, by Granting Certain Duties upon Income, in Lieu of the Said Duties, 
1799, 39 Geo. 3, c. 13 (Eng.) [hereinafter 1799 Act]; see also PIROSKA E. SOOS, THE ORIGINS OF 
TAXATION AT SOURCE IN ENGLAND 145–47 (1997). 
117. 1799 Act, supra note 116, § 38; see also Harris, supra note 112, at 406. 
118. Stebbings, supra note 104, at 651. 
119. Id. at 653–62; see also 1799 Act, supra note 116, §§ 2, 17, 22, 23, 99; An Act to Repeal the 
Duties Imposed by an Act, Made in the Last Session of Parliament, for Granting an Aid and 
Contribution for the Prosecution of the War . . . , 1799, 39 Geo. 3, c. 22 (Eng.); An Act to Enable the 
Commercial Commissioners Appointed to Carry Into Execution Certain Acts for Granting Duties 
Upon Income . . . , 1799, 39 Geo. 3, c. 42, § 8 (Eng.). 
120. Stebbings, supra note 104, at 662–63. 
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sources of income to different officials. In this way, no single official would have a 
comprehensive knowledge of the taxpayer’s income, and thus the danger of 
information leakage revealing the taxpayer’s entire income would be minimized. 
An additional tool used by Addington was the deduction of tax at source rather 
than asking taxpayers to report their income.121 
For a while, it seemed as if Addington’s 1803 tax successfully balanced the 
need of the state to collect information and the taxpayers’ desire to maintain their 
privacy, but in 1816 a major debate over income taxation erupted, and this debate 
ultimately led to the abolition of the tax. Two major arguments were raised by 
opponents of income taxation. One argument had to do with the assertion often 
repeated by the government that income taxation was a war measure that would 
be repealed as soon as the war ended. Napoleon’s final defeat and exile to Saint 
Helena in 1815 spurred opponents of the income tax to demand its abolition. The 
second argument used by opponents of the tax had to do with its novelty. In what 
sense was the tax a novel one? 
3. The Novelty of Income Taxation  
Histories of income taxation sometimes describe the emergence of income 
taxation in the late eighteenth century as part of a continuous evolutionary 
process. The income tax incorporated many features found in previous taxes, and 
one can trace the origins of some of its categories, such as the distinction between 
capital and income, backward to centuries of poll, land, and other types of direct 
taxes. Gradualist histories of income taxation therefore do not describe the 
emergence of the income tax as a rupture. Instead, they see continuity, arguing 
that the taxation of income existed in an embryonic form in English taxation since 
the Middle Ages.122  
While many terms and definitions used by the early English income tax acts 
can indeed be linked to the past, the assumption of continuity may also be 
misleading. Income taxation was also a major change in the history of English 
taxation: luxury taxes on a haphazard list of items—servants, carriages, horses, 
houses, windows, dogs, clocks, and watches—were replaced by a tax on “all 
income,” and a system focused on external markers of wealth was suddenly 
transformed into one focused on an internal, hard-to-know attribute of 
taxpayers—their income. In this sense, the rise of income taxation can be seen as 
a reflection, in the tax field, of the more general emergence of the modern, 
unitary, inner notion of the self that historian Dror Wahrman discusses in his 
 
121. Id. at 664–65. 
122. See Harris, supra note 112, at 389, 407, 465, 467, 473–75, 488–89; see also DAUNTON, 
supra note 87, at 13–17. For an earlier gradualist statement, see EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE 
INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT 
HOME AND ABROAD 4–5 (1911).  
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work.123 The shift from a tax system focused on visible objects to one taxing 
invisible attributes (income) also meant a shift from voluntary to involuntary 
taxation. Until the enactment of the income tax, taxation was perceived by 
taxpayers as being, in a certain sense, voluntary because the luxuries, the markers 
of wealth that were being taxed, were revealed by the taxpayer to the state by their 
very possession or consumption (and indeed often flaunted by the taxpayers as 
status symbols). Now suddenly the system became one in which the state had the 
power to demand from each taxpayer upon oath the “particular circumstances” of 
his “private situation.”124 The revolutionary aspect of the 1799 tax was thus not 
found in the legal categories used by the new tax (“income versus capital” for 
example). Instead, the shift was administrative—the income tax was novel because 
it was based on a new type of relationship between the taxpayer and state, one in 
which the state was empowered to ask taxpayers to involuntarily reveal 
information about their “inner” financial affairs.125  
The emergence of an intrusive system of information gathering for tax 
purposes was part of a wider process in which the central state created systems of 
information collection and inspection.126 Some aspects of the “information state” 
already existed prior to the eighteenth century.127 However, the income tax was 
seen by contemporaries as significantly different. This was because state 
knowledge of the income of its subjects required far more information about 
invisible aspects of taxpayers’ lives.128  
 
123. On the “making of the modern self,” see Wahrman, supra note 105.  
124. W. HAMILTON REID, MEMOIRS OF THE PUBLIC LIFE OF JOHN HORNE TOOKE, ESQ. 
139 (London, Sherwood, Neely & Jones 1812); see also THE NEW ANNUAL REGISTER, OR GENERAL 
REPOSITORY OF HISTORY, POLITICS AND LITERATURE FOR THE YEAR 1799, at 116, 134 (London, 
G. G. & J. Robinson 1800); William Phillips, The Origin of Income Tax, 1967 BRIT. TAX REV. 113, 119 
(1967). On the taxation of luxury items, see also CHRISTOPHER J. BERRY, THE IDEA OF LUXURY: A 
CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION 206–08 (1994). 
125. On the novel intrusive nature of the tax as the major reason for its unpopularity, see 
ARTHUR HOPE-JONES, INCOME TAX IN THE NAPOLEONIC WARS 114–15 (1939). See also Lamb, 
supra note 87, at 271, 293 (2001) (noting that income taxation was novel in the sense that it created 
calculable subjects). For studies of income and other forms of direct taxation in nonwestern and 
colonial contexts that have already noted the novelty of modern taxation and connected it to a state’s 
desire to “know” its subjects and to tear down barriers protecting the taxpayers from the power of 
the state, see, for example, Kotsonis, supra note 111, at 221 (discussing this process in late Imperial 
Russia); Yanni Kotsonis, “No Place to Go”: Taxation and State Transformation in Late Imperial and Early 
Soviet Russia, 76 J. MOD. HIST. 531 (2004) (discussing the process in early Soviet Russia); Bush & 
Maltby, supra note 54 (discussing colonial Africa). 
126. DAUNTON, supra note 87, at 194; see also Miles Ogborn, Local Power and State Regulation in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain, 17 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 215 (1992). 
127. See generally EDWARD HIGGS, THE INFORMATION STATE IN ENGLAND: THE CENTRAL 
COLLECTION OF INFORMATION ON CITIZENS SINCE 1500 (2004). On the use of invasive practices 
in the collection of taxes, see also JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE 
ENGLISH STATE, 1688–1783 (1988) (discussing the growing power of the early modern state to 
gather information); BARRELL, supra note 110, at 145–209 (discussing intrusive practices, such as the 
taxpayer register, or the use of informers, which were associated with the 1795 tax on hair powder).  
128. See, e.g., 2 JAMES ANDERSON, RECREATIONS IN AGRICULTURE, NATURAL-HISTORY, 
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This novel aspect of the tax clearly appears in contemporary debates about 
income taxation. In the early eighteenth century, reporting information about 
one’s wealth to the state was not seen as a problem.129 By the mid-eighteenth 
century, however, privacy concerns about taxation were already present. Adam 
Smith suggested that a window tax was better than a hearth tax because windows 
are visible markers of wealth and would thus not require the tax collector to enter 
the taxpayer’s home. Smith also argued that “it is a hardship upon a man in trade 
to oblige him to show his books, which is the only way in which we can know 
how much he is worth. It is a breach of liberty and may be productive of very bad 
consequences by ruining his credit.”130  
Smith’s approach was mentioned by Prime Minister Pitt in 1797, two years 
before the enactment of the income tax. The taxation of income is not possible, 
said Pitt, because a person’s wealth should only be taxed once it is exposed to the 
gaze of the state by consumption: “I know no act to make property the subject of 
taxation while it is not rendered conducive to the pleasure or convenience, or 
rendered visible by the optional expenditure of the person who possesses it,” said 
Pitt on that occasion.131 
Once the income tax appeared in 1799, observers were quick to note its 
novelty, one observer commenting that “[t]he income act “is certainly the political 
innovation of the greatest magnitude that hath taken place in our day.”132 
Opposition to the income tax based on its novelty continued to inform debates 
until 1816 when income taxation was abolished. In these debates, the income tax 
was often called “singular and unparalleled,”133 “a harsh innovation upon our 
system,”134 and “a tax [that] is wholly and absolutely new—new in the history of 
 
ARTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS LITERATURE 50–55 (London, T. Bensley 1800) (discussing the 
argument that outward appearances may not give an accurate knowledge of income). 
129. See 2 FRANCIS HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 341 (Continuum 
International Publishing Group 2005) (1755) (suggesting “a census or an estimation made of all the 
wealth of private families” whose only impact, it was said, would be to detect “a few broken 
merchants” thus preventing them from defrauding their creditors); THOMAS ANDREWS, AN 
ENQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES OF THE ENCREASE AND MISERIES OF THE POOR OF ENGLAND 82 
(London, A. Bettesworth & C. Hitch 1738) (discussing the need to require merchants to declare their 
wealth annually); see also KENNEDY, supra note 113, at 125. 
130. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JUSTICE, POLICE, REVENUE AND ARMS 239–40 (Edwin 
Cannan ed., 1896); see 2 ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 845–46 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner 
eds., Glasgow ed. 1976); see also HOPE-JONES, supra note 125, at 5; Beverly Moran, Adam Smith and the 
Search for an Ideal Tax System, in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY, supra note 15, at 201, 204 (discussing 
Smith’s objections to income taxation). 
131.  TIMES, Feb. 21, 1816, at 3. See also Robin L. Einhorn, Liberty, Democracy and Capacity: 
Lessons from the Early American Tax Regimes, in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY, supra note 15, at 155, 
158 (describing an earlier version of the visibility requirement found in the 1646 Massachusetts 
“country rate” that taxed “all personal and real estates” and required tax commissioners to make a list 
of “all visible estate either at sea or on shore”) 
132. ANDERSON, supra note 128, at 58. 
133. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1816, at 3. 
134. V., To the Editors of the Times, TIMES, Feb. 6, 1816, at 3. 
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the world.”135  
Of course, despite the fact that many Englishmen argued that the tax was 
novel, the fact is that income taxation (and the procedural mechanisms associated 
with it) was not invented in 1799. Englishmen may not have been aware of the 
invasive practices, including declarations of income and the right to inspect 
account books, found in places like Renaissance Florence, but they were certainly 
aware of the similarity between the modern income tax and biblical tithes.136 Some 
opponents of the income tax therefore spent a lot of energy trying to distinguish 
between modern income taxation and biblical tithes. An 1816 pamphlet tried to 
confront this problem by arguing that the main difference between biblical tithes 
and the modern tax was that Moses, the creator of biblical tithes,  
had no iniquities to exercise—no commissioners to appoint, to examine 
secret papers, and pry into the mysteries of enterprise, and the secrets of 
private families—no merchants’ books and manufacturers’ registers to 
ransack and misinterpret. He penetrated into no cabinets and pensioned 
no spies—challenged no returns and encouraged no hireling 
denunciators . . . the property of his people, all open to the sun; all 
agricultural, flocks, or corn; was easily ascertained . . . . 137 
However, modern English society is “composed of such million individuals, of 
mixed, heterogeneous, and indefinable possessions; such complicated interests, 
and such unseizable gains.”138 Because the income of certain taxpayers is easily 
concealed, and that of others is not, the modern income tax is a “wretched and 
most ill-advised copy of the Mosaical tythe; attempted in time and place so totally 
different, the very reverse of the other, that its exercise here becomes at once 
impertinent and ridiculous.”139 
4. The Inquisition Argument 
One of the major arguments used by the opponents of the income tax to 
prove its novelty was the “inquisition argument.” Taxes imposed in the last decade 
of the eighteenth century, such as the tax on hair powder or the Triple 
Assessment, were already condemned for “erecting an inquisition of 
commissioners, assistant commissioners, surveyors, assessors, inspectors, clerks, 
 
135. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1816, at 2. 
136. On the pre-1799 history of income taxation, see HOPE-JONES, supra note 125, at 9; 
SELIGMAN, supra note 122, at 41–47; Joseph J. Thorndike, An Army of Officials: The Civil War Bureau of 
Internal Revenue, 93 TAX NOTES 1739, 1739–42 (2001). On English and continental eighteenth-century 
income tax schemes, see generally William Phillips, The Origin of Income Tax, 1967 BRIT. TAX REV 113 
(1967). On pre-modern notions of income, see, for example, Adam Chodorow, Maaser Kesafim and the 
Development of Tax Law, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 153 (2007). 
137. D.E., COMPARATIVE REFLEXIONS ON THE MOSAICAL TYTHE, THE TYTHE OF 
MODERN TIMES AND THE INCOME TAX OF THE LATE WM. PITT 12 (Exeter, E. Woolmer 1816). 
138. Id. at 10.  
139. Id. at 12.  
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and informers,” who were “licensed thieves.”140 Once the income tax appeared in 
1799, privacy concerns became even more pronounced. The tax would contravene 
the principle that “every man’s house was called his castle.” It was considered “a 
most harsh and severely oppressive tax” because of  
the sort of inquisition that was about to be set up to enforce and collect 
it. In fact, every man was to have an exciseman set over him in his house, 
in order to pry into, and almost put him to the rack, to compel him to 
discover all those private circumstances of his income, which, for a 
thousand reasons, he must anxiously wish to preserve locked up in his 
own breast.141  
Another critic of the tax decried the “tremendous inquisition, the income 
tax, invented, no doubt, to curb the pride, and crush the spirit, and break the 
backs, necks and hearts of all good Englishmen!”142 One Member of Parliament 
argued in 1802 that “the income tax has created an inquisitorial power of the most 
partial, offensive and cruel nature. The whole transactions of a life may be 
inquired into, family affairs laid open.”143 Opposition to the income taxation 
“inquisition” was often framed using constitutional terms. One of the tax’s 
harshest critiques was the Whig MP George Tierney, a personal enemy of Pitt.144 
Tierney often argued that the income tax was unconstitutional (in the English 
sense) because it undermined privacy. In one parliamentary debate in 1800 Tierney 
complained that the tax  
struck a vital blow at the Constitution; for by the operation of it, spies 
and informers were generated and encouraged . . . . [H]e would not say 
that there was anything disgraceful in men going round and ascertaining 
the number of horses a man keeps or the number of windows in a house, 
but it was quite different when men were required to give a report of 
 
140. JOSEPH CAWTHORNE, THE INJUSTICE AND IMPOLICY OF THE BILL TO INCREASE THE 
ASSESSED TAXES 12, 33 (London, J. Parsons 1798); see also BARRELL, supra note 110, at 204 
(discussing the tax on hair powder). 
141. 11 THE PARLIAMENTARY REGISTER 341 (1797–1800). See also THE NEW ANNUAL 
REGISTER, supra note 124, at 116, 124, 125, 133, 135, 138; 2 WILLIAM WOODFALL, AN IMPARTIAL 
REPORT OF THE DEBATES THAT OCCUR IN THE TWO HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT 391 (London, T. 
Chapman 1798–1799). On the sources of the maxim “an Englishman’s home is his castle,” see 
Amanda Vickery, An Englishman’s Home Is His Castle: Thresholds, Boundaries and Privacies in the Eighteenth-
Century London House, 199 PAST & PRESENT 147, 154 (2008). On the use of informers in late 
eighteenth-century England, see, for example, Clive Emsley, The Home Office and Its Sources of 
Information and Investigation 1791–1801, 94 ENGLISH HIST. REV. 532 (1979). 
142. THOMAS JONES, THE DISMISSAL OF HIS MAJESTY’S MINISTERS CONSIDERE[D] 11 
(London, J.S. Jordan 1800). A petition against the tax submitted by the City of London in the House 
of Commons in March 1802 stated that “the said tax, by vesting an arbitrary and inquisitorial power 
in the hands of Commissioners, is vexatious and degrading to individuals, destructive to the credit and 
happiness of families, subversive of that spirit of independence so necessary to the security of a free 
state.” See A Common Council Holden in the Chamber of the Guildhall of the City of London, Tuesday, the 30th of 
March, 1802, TIMES, Apr. 1, 1802, at 1. 
143. DAUNTON, supra note 87, at 46. 
144. See, e.g., Stebbings, supra note 104, at 653.  
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
882 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:3 
 
one’s income, which, on the supposition of concealment, could only be 
ascertained or known by bribing clerks, servants, etc.145  
Tierney was not the only opponent of the tax who used constitutional 
privacy arguments. In calling for the repeal of the income tax, Benjamin Travers 
of London said in 1802 that the tax “was an attack on the [l]iberty and 
[c]onstitution of the country and . . . even more arbitrary than the [i]nquisition of 
Spain.”146 A petition submitted by the City of London to the House of Commons 
in March 1802, called for the repeal of the income tax, stating that by giving 
inquisitorial power to commissioners, the tax “establishes a dangerous and 
alarming innovation upon the principles of the British Constitution.”147 A meeting 
of prominent London merchants convened to discuss the proposition for reviving 
the income tax in 1803 explained that the income tax was objectionable “not so 
much on account of the impost paid . . . as upon the arbitrary and unconstitutional 
powers under which it was exacted, by Commissioners armed with inquisitorial 
authority to examine into the private affairs of commercial men, which was 
repugnant to the spirit and feeling of Englishmen . . . .”148 
It seems that after the reintroduction of income taxation in 1803 opposition 
to the tax on the basis of its inquisitorial nature disappeared.149 This was partly the 
result of the fact that the reintroduced tax was structured in a way that prevented 
any single official from obtaining information about the taxpayer’s total income. 
Indeed, in a debate in 1806 even the opponents of the tax admitted that “it 
certainly was divested of some principles extremely obnoxious . . . [such as] [t]he 
principle of disclosure . . . a principle so peculiarly galling to the feeling of 
Englishmen . . . .”150  
There were a few diehard critics of the tax from 1803 to 1812. For example, 
one Member of Parliament, William Smith, still complained in 1806 of officials 
“vested with the power of prying into the property and private affairs of persons 
in all classes, high and low . . . .”151 A solicitor, Charles Rivers, argued in a 
pamphlet published in 1808 that the tax assessors and surveyors had power “to act 
the part of [s]pies and [i]nformers, who are said to receive 5 [percent] as a 
remuneration on all additional payments made through their information,”152 and 
 
145. Parliamentary Intelligence, TIMES, June 6, 1800, at 2; see also T.H.B. OLDFIELD, 2 THE 
REPRESENTATIVE HISTORY OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND 100–01 (London, Baldwin, Cardock 
& Joy 1816). 
146. Repeal of the Income Tax, TIMES, Mar. 19, 1802, at 3. 
147. A Common Council Holden in the Chamber of the Guildhall of the City of London, Tuesday, the 30th 
of March, 1802, [Classified Advertising] TIMES, Apr. 1, 1802, at 1.  
148. City Meeting, TIMES, June 23, 1803, at 3. 
149. SELIGMAN, supra note 122, at 105–06. 
150. Parliamentary Intelligence, TIMES, May 8, 1806 (speech by William Smith); see also 
Parliamentary Intelligence, Jan. 30, 1807 (stating that the new tax “got rid of many vexations [in the old 
tax], and particularly of the inquisitorial power that was much complained of”). 
151. Parliamentary Intelligence, TIMES, May 8, 1806 (speech by William Smith). 
152. CHARLES RIVERS, THE APPEAL OF AN INJURED INDIVIDUAL TO THE BRITISH NATION 
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that Commissioners who hear tax appeals subject taxpayers belonging to the 
professions to an “inquisitorial torture . . . of being asked questions concerning 
the supposed concealment of” their property. These Commissioners, said Rivers, 
are “obscure individuals, many of whom are very illiterate, of narrow contracted 
ideas, and large prejudices.” He even insinuated that the Commissioners, who do 
not receive remuneration, share the five percent reward with the informers.153 
However, generally speaking, between 1803 and 1812 the inquisition argument 
seems to have disappeared.  
Beginning in 1812, and culminating in the debate surrounding the abolition 
of the tax in 1816, the inquisitorial argument was revived. In an 1812 meeting of 
the Livery of London, one participant decried “the inquisition of the Income-tax,” 
which “was suspended over our heads; and we are called before tribunals at their 
own pleasure, to give an account of our private affairs.”154 Another London 
merchant described the growth in the bureaucracy administering the tax, noting 
that “this machine appeared now advancing to its perfection and it would soon be 
able to grind to dust the greater part of the trading population of London. It was a 
machine most tyrannically constructed and which could not be honestly or 
honourably carried into execution,” adding that people often falsely reported 
incomes that were greater than their actual income in order to preserve their credit 
worthiness.155 In an 1814 meeting of the Livery of London, one of the speakers 
talked about the “infernal machine of taxation.”156 In a debate about the tax in the 
House of Commons in February 1815, one member said that “the tax was 
inquisitorial in the highest degree. People might as well go before the bench of 
bishops to state their faith, as before the income-tax commissioners to make a 
declaration of their affairs.”157  
Attacks on the income tax peaked in February and March 1816, during the 
campaign to abolish the tax following the end of the Napoleonic wars. Many 
letters, petitions and newspapers articles written during this period referred to the 
“detestable” tax as “a project of establishing a permanent inquisition into every 
man’s income.”158 A Times editorial portrayed the income tax as an ominous, all-
 
5–6 (London, J.M. Richardson 1808). 
153. Id. at 5–10. 
154. Meeting of the Livery of London, TIMES, Mar. 27, 1812, at 1.  
155. Common Hall, TIMES, Mar. 27, 1812, at 3. 
156. Common Hall, TIMES, Dec. 14, 1814, at 3. 
157. House of Commons, TIMES, Feb. 21, 1815, at 2. 
158. The Question of the Income Tax Being Settled, TIMES, Mar. 20, 1816, at 3; see also The Happy 
Condolence of the Courier Newspaper, TIMES, Mar. 21, 1816, at 3 (“the British inquisition”); We Perceive, 
TIMES, Mar. 22, 1816, at 3 (“a cruel inquisition”); The Proceeding in the House of Commons, TIMES, Mar. 
26, 1816, at 3 (“an odious inquisition”); TIMES, Sept. 6, 1817, at 2 (“fiscal inquisition”); V., To the 
Editor of the Times, TIMES, Feb. 15, 1816, at 3 (“[T]he most unprincipled and hateful of all measures 
that could be devised for breaking down the spirit of a great people, and enabling their rulers to 
command, by overwhelming armed force, the tyrannical exposure of any private transaction—the 
rude violation of the most sacred sanctuaries of honour, faith, and feeling amongst men,” a “state 
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knowing spirit haunting every Englishman: 
There is nothing that men in a state of society hold sacred, into which 
[the tax] does not obtrude itself or thrust its odious agents. It pries into 
the marriage-settlements, and claims of consanguinity, among the living; 
it ransacks the wills of the dead; it hunts deeds, bonds and mortgages, in 
the deepest recesses of the bureau, and drags them to light. Rushing into 
the counting-house, it spreads wide the ledger and thereby blasts 
commercial confidence, and chills mercantile speculation. It stands at the 
door of the shopkeeper and counts his customers: it mounts the chariot 
of the physician, and numbers his fees. It adjusts the claims between 
debtor and creditor, whose relation to each other should only be known 
to themselves. It computes the feeling of filial piety, of gratitude, and 
humanity, by items of pounds, shillings, and pence; for it estimates the 
support allowed to decrepit old age, to decayed services, perhaps to 
penitent or discarded guilt.159 
Another contemporary report talked about “a tax so searching and 
unpitying” that “it strips us perfectly naked,” granting the commissioners  
the right of fetching up every man in this country from his home, his 
barn, his shop, his counting-house, and of demanding from him how he 
lives,—what profits he makes by his toil, his trade, or profession,—what 
allowance he assigns out of it for the maintenance of children or parents, 
or other poor relatives,—what debts he has incurred with others, or 
others have with him: there is not, in truth, a secret which, from motives 
of feeling, honour, delicacy or convenience, a man would keep inviolate 
in his own bosom, that the persons acting under this inquisitorial process 
have not a right to tear from him.160 
Readers praised the Times for attacking the tax that enabled “the tyrannical 
exposure of any private transaction—the rude violation of the most sacred 
sanctuaries of honour, faith, and feeling amongst men,” which was a “lay 
inquisition,” undermining the “whole fabric of English freedom,” with “the 
despotic spirit of this inquisitorial impost, with its brood of petty tyrants in every 
village through the land.”161  
Arguments made during the 1816 campaign to abolish the tax repeated the 
earlier assertions that income taxation undermined the English constitution. The 
tax was again described as “adverse to the freedom and spirit of the British 
Constitution.”162 This tax, said one speaker at a county meeting “was so 
 
inquisition,” “lay inquisition,” and an “inquisitorial impost, with its brood of petty tyrants in every 
village through the land . . . a government, exercising inquisitorial prerogatives in the collection of a 
single tax, will easily build upon this precedent of tyranny, and the subject, used to submit in one case, 
[will] tolerate his degradation in many more.”). 
159. Editorial, TIMES, Feb. 6, 1816, at 3.  
160. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1816, at 3. 
161. To the Editors of the Times, TIMES, Feb. 15, 1816, at 3. 
162. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1816, at 2. 
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inquisitorial in its nature, and unconstitutional in its principle, that in no way, by 
no argument, could it be justified . . . .”163 
When attempts were made to reintroduce income taxation after 1816, 
opponents were quick to use privacy arguments again. Thus, for example, when 
proposals appeared in 1817 for the reintroduction of the tax, The Times declared 
that “we deny . . . that in a free country Government has a right to know the 
property of all its subjects, and still less has it a right to force them to make 
confession of that property by penal statutes.”164 Indeed, echoes of the same 
attitude can be found in the debates surrounding the revival of income taxation in 
1842.165 
Despite the prevalence of the inquisition argument, not all Englishmen saw 
intrusion as a bad thing. One type of response to privacy arguments was to argue 
that the negative impact on privacy was small in relation to the benefits of the tax. 
Another approach was to say that the intrusion into the private affairs of the 
taxpayers was actually desirable because of the benefits to individuals and to 
society that would ensue from the data collected on incomes.  
The argument in support of income tax as an information-collection tool can 
be found in an early discussion of income taxation, a 1738 pamphlet written by 
Thomas Andrews. Andrews argued that the information collected by income 
taxation would enable the creation of rules that would limit the use of luxuries by 
people whose income was small, thus preventing people from passing off as 
belonging to a higher class: “rules might be taken more easily and justly,” said 
Andrews,  
from such a method of taxing, than from anything else that I can think 
of, to regulate people’s expenses, and to confine the enormous luxuries 
of the age within some reasonable bounds—were those people, their 
wives and children, whose income was not rated on the taxes, at so much 
a year, prohibited [from] wearing silk another keeping a livery-servant; 
another stiling [sic] himself a gentlemen, esquire etc. another keeping his 
 
163. Surrey County Meeting, TIMES, Mar. 11, 1816, at 3. 
164. A Morning Paper of Yesterday, TIMES, Sept. 6, 1817, at 2; see also THOMAS PEREGRINE 
COURTENAY, A TREATISE UPON THE POOR LAWS 151–52 (London, John Murray 1818) (noting the 
scrutiny of private affairs that the tax entails). 
165. RICHARD VYVYAN,  A LETTER FROM SIR RICHARD VYVYAN, BART. M.P., TO HIS 
CONSTITUENTS UPON THE COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL POLICY OF SIR ROBERT PEEL’S 
ADMINISTRATION 12–14 (London, J. Bohn 1842) (The tax was “an inquisitorial impost,” and the fact 
that it compels “every free-born Englishman” to “render an account to the government of all his 
pecuniary transactions . . . is hostile to the spirit of liberty.”). The success of the inquisition argument 
led to its use against less intrusive taxes. Thus, in a debate about the Irish window tax in 1818, an Irish 
Member of Parliament said that  
this tax had that inquisitorial character which was charged against the income tax here. If 
every Englishman’s house was his castle, the Irish could have little cause to say so while 
this tax existed. A man might enter any house, on any day from 8 in the morning till sunset 
and a refusal involved a penalty of 20l.  
Parliamentary Intelligence, TIMES, Apr. 22, 1818, at 2. 
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coach; another wearing jewels etc. it would be a good way toward helping 
us out of the confusion we are at present fallen into in these things; and, 
at once, restore the honours and distinctions of this sort, due to our 
nobility, gentry, merchants and others of real ability; and give a beautiful 
face of oeconomy and order to the state. In doing so, the laws would, in 
some measure, confine people to the practice of frugality, and take it out 
of their power to spend their substance in vainly mimicking their 
superiors.166 
A later proponent of the income tax, George Edwards, echoed this 
approach. In a book written in support of income taxation in 1788, Edwards 
argued that income taxation is not revolutionary.167 He did, however, admit that it 
would lead to administrative innovation: the establishment of a “[p]olice of public 
service” to collect the tax.168 Edwards then asked whether this new “[p]olice of 
public service” would be intrusive, and in reply he said that the “great secrecy 
which so many people observe in regard to the amount of their incomes” is 
“ridiculous” because “at least three fourths of every man’s acquaintances know 
what is the amount of his income.” “Is the whole community to suffer on account 
of such folly and absurdity of a few?” he asked rhetorically, arguing that the 
income tax was too good an idea to be rejected because of “a few proud and 
squeamish feelings of a very small part of the community,” who “refuse to save 
their county, by communicating two or three absurd secrets to a confidential 
person, who would never reveal them . . . .” Such persons, he concluded rather 
dramatically, would meet their just fate, “if their naked bodies lay unburied upon 
fields covered with their gore.”169  
One of the arguments Edwards used in support of the tax was that it gave 
not only the government but also subjects a new way of obtaining information 
about national and individual consumption and regulating it: “[a] nation hitherto 
much blamed on account of its natural dissipation and extravagance will be 
directed to the most proper means of removing this stigma: for the observation of 
all its inhabitants will be turned to their incomes; and their attention directed to 
economy.”170 
Such sentiments were also found in other works. Thomas “Clio” Rickman, a 
 
166. ANDREWS, supra note 129, at 83. Some might read this passage as satire, but, based on 
the context it seems that Andrews was serious. He devoted a whole chapter of his pamphlet to an 
attack on luxuries, noting however that “nothing ought to be accounted luxurious which is proper to 
distinguish between the different orders and degrees of persons in the commonwealth.” Id. at 22–23.  
167. See GEORGE EDWARDS, THE AGGRANDISEMENT AND NATIONAL PERFECTION OF 
GREAT BRITAIN 246 (London, Debrett 1788).  
168. Id. at 254, 260. 
169. Id. at 270–71. 
170. Id. at 245. This may be an interesting example of two contradictory Foucauldian notions 
of the use of knowledge—knowledge as a technique of domination and as a technique of the self. See 
generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY: TWELVE 
LECTURES 27 (1987). 
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Quaker poet and political pamphleteer rejected, in 1800, the categorization of 
income information as private, equating it not with the inner essence of 
individuals but instead with outward appearances: “I do not see why the exact 
state of a man’s pecuniary affairs should not be known, as well as the colour of his 
coat, or the complexion of his countenance.” Indeed, Rickman thought that the 
tax was justified not just because of the revenue it provided but also because  
it would be well if every iota of every man’s income, whether in or out of 
business, could be known. If it could be ascertained, what property every 
man hath, and how he gets and applies it; it would be, like a correct chart 
to a mariner, a guide over the rocks, and through the mazes of society.171 
5. Tax Privacy and English Culture 
What lessons can one learn from the history of the tax privacy debates? 
While it is clear that privacy was a major issue for late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century English taxpayers, it seems that the history of tax privacy 
cannot be reduced to a story about the reflection of general cultural notions of 
privacy in tax law debates. There are two reasons why this is so. First, the privacy 
of information about income was presented by opponents of the income tax as an 
English tradition, but it was, in fact, a contested notion. Privacy was not a concern 
shared by everybody in English society. Supporters of the income tax, such as 
Edwards and Rickman, thought that privacy should not be an important concern 
(and, evidently, the government agreed, at least until 1816). Of course, one could 
argue that culture is never homogenous, and that therefore the existence of a 
variety of approaches to tax privacy is not problematic: there were minority and 
majority positions about privacy and Edwards and Rickman (but also the 
government) represented the minority position.  
However, tax privacy was not merely a contested notion. It was also quite 
dynamic. Privacy arguments appeared in debates about the tax between 1799 and 
1803, and again after 1812, especially in 1816. In the intervening period it seems 
that most English taxpayers were more or less resigned to the intrusion into their 
private financial affairs that the income tax entailed.  
 
171. THOMAS CLIO RICKMAN, MR. PITT’S DEMOCRACY MANIFESTED 9–10, 28 (London, A. 
Seale 1800). On Rickman’s pamphlet see also SELIGMAN, supra note 122, at 85–86. Publicity was also 
seen as a way of preventing tax evasion, and in some discussions of the income tax immediately after 
its enactment, one could find members of parliament supporting the publication of tax return 
information because of such considerations. For example, in a debate in the House of Commons on 
an amendment to the income tax act ordering that returns will be given sealed to the assessors, one 
MP, Sir James Pulteney, supported the publication of taxpayer returns as a way of preventing tax 
evasion. Another MP, W. Buxton, said that “he was a friend of publicity, because it was desirable that 
those who lived above their incomes should have the real state of their fortunes exposed.” The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, however, said that while he supported the publication of the returns, 
not merely as a way to ensure payment, but also because “it would give satisfaction to the country to 
see what was paid by each individual,” this was not a suggested measure in the amendment that was 
being debated. WOODFALL, supra note 141, at 389–93. 
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The income tax debates, therefore, do not provide a keyhole through which 
we can get a glimpse of the way English culture in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century viewed privacy. Privacy was a contested and dynamic term, and 
tax law debates (and also the actual provisions of the income tax act) were not 
merely passive mirrors of the general culture, but also a site in which notions of 
privacy were being shaped.  
As in the first case study, here too one might claim that privacy arguments 
against income taxation could only have been raised because they resonated with a 
widely shared notion of privacy espoused by the majority of English taxpayers, 
and epitomized by maxims such as “an Englishman’s home is his castle.” 
However, it is impossible to tell from the sources used here whether privacy was a 
widely shared notion in English culture prior to the debates or whether these 
debates created a sense of privacy that did not previously exist.  
Indeed, it seems logical to argue that while relatively unarticulated notions of 
privacy did exist in “outside” culture prior to the debates, the income tax debates 
(and the impact they had on the creation of formal tax privacy norms in English 
income tax legislation) actually changed the notion of privacy in English culture. 
Income tax legislation required taxpayers to reveal their income to the state, but at 
the same time created mechanisms that protected this information from leakage to 
fellow taxpayers. Thus, the notion of privacy in English culture was transformed 
by the legislation. It gained force as far as relations between the individual and the 
rest of society were concerned but lost force in the relationship between the 
individual and the state.  
Just as in the previous case study, the arguments discussed in this section of 
the article (in this case, about privacy) may have been a tool invented to further 
political interests, either consciously or not, of the opponents of the tax, a passive 
and authentic reflection of some widely shared beliefs of large segments of a given 
society, or a combination of both, and deciding between these three alternatives is 
difficult.  
However, just as in the first case study, there are some aspects of debate that 
are more certain. It seems that the most obvious point that an analysis of the 
debate reveals is that opponents of the tax used “constitution” as an argument to 
undermine the income tax. Comparing the use of “constitution” here and 
“culture” in the previous case study is one of the points I would like to discuss 
now, in the Conclusion of the Article. 
CONCLUSION: “THE THUNDER OF WORLD HISTORY”? 
In the nineteenth century, many lawyers and historians became interested in 
the elusive pursuit of spirits. Legal theories originating in the German historical 
school assumed that law reflected the national spirit (Volksgeist) and that the role 
of lawyers was to explain how each specific legal norm is a reflection of the “spirit 
of the people.” Cultural history, Geistesgeschichte, sought to discover not only the 
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national spirit but also the “spirit of the age”—Zeitgeist—in products of the past.172 
Schumpeter’s “spirit of a people” echoes this nineteenth-century tradition.  
Schumpeter’s antiquated notion of culture—national, homogenous, 
autonomous, and distinct from other spheres of human activity—is no longer in 
fashion. However, Schumpeter’s “symptom” and “cause” analysis of the relation 
of taxation and society seems more modern. One finds in it an echo of the two 
dominant twentieth-century modes of analyzing the relationship of law and society 
and law and culture.  
As the two case studies analyzed in this article show, it is sometimes difficult 
to clearly find the exact vector of causation between “law” and “culture.” Cultural 
arguments such as “income tax is culturally specific and therefore cannot be 
imposed in Palestine” or “income tax is unconstitutional because it gives the state 
too much power to penetrate the affairs of its subjects, and thus contravenes 
traditional views of state-subject relations,” appeared in debates about income 
taxation in Palestine and Britain. These arguments may have reflected a set of 
notions that actually existed “outside” and prior to these debates, but this 
“culture” may have had little relation to actual notions that existed at the time. It 
may have been a conscious construct that served the political and economic needs 
of specific interest groups with little relation to reality, or an unconscious 
discursive formation that, again, had little relation to reality.  
Perhaps, it might be argued, the inability to clearly separate reflection and 
construction (or some determinate combination of both) is the result of the use of 
the wrong sources. The research projects described in this article devoted a lot of 
attention to tax debates rather than tax law in the narrow sense—law found in 
legislation or case law. While reflection and constitution may have been 
intertwined in such debates, they may be more easily separable in specifically legal 
texts. In addition, the government documents and newspaper reports, used in the 
first project, or the parliamentary records, newspaper reports, pamphlets, and 
petitions employed in the second project, may simply not be the right sources to 
determine the relation of culture and law. One should have looked elsewhere—for 
example one could have used sources describing everyday practices involved in 
encounters between tax collectors and taxpayers,173 or quantitative approaches.174 
 
172. See, e.g., F.C. VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND 
JURISPRUDENCE (Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ed. 2002) (Abraham Hayward trans., 1842) (on law); 
BURKE, supra note 8, at 8–9 (on nineteenth-century cultural history). 
173. See Lamb, supra note 87.  
174. For an example of a contemporary attempt to capture “culture” based on quantifiable 
data collected in large surveys, see Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture Matters: National Value Cultures, Sources 
and Consequences, in UNDERSTANDING CULTURE: THEORY, RESEARCH AND APPLICATION 127 
(Robert S. Wyre et al. eds., 2009). A survey-based approach is, of course, irrelevant to past societies, 
although quantitative methods tracing the changing fortunes of key cultural terms in legal texts are 
still possible. For one example of an attempt to use a quantitative analysis of legal texts to learn 
something about cultural notions, see Assaf Likhovski, ‘Tyranny’ in Nineteenth-Century American Legal 
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It is only when our informants are engaged in daily practices and are paying less 
attention to what they say, or when we have many informants whose information 
can be cross-checked, that we can really learn about the relationship between law 
and culture (just as dreams are the proper way to gain access to the unconscious of 
specific individuals).  
My response to such a critique is that the problem may be deeper than 
simply a problem of sources. It seems that there is an irresolvable tension in the 
definition of both law and culture. Both entities have top-down and bottom-up, 
conscious and unconscious, explicit and implicit definitions. Thus, “culture” is 
sometimes defined as a bottom-up and unconscious, almost natural, entity 
emanating from “the people,” and sometimes as a top-down product of elite 
actors consciously striving to shape reality in the interest of power. 
In the same way, law is sometimes equated with custom, and therefore 
viewed as a bottom-up and unconscious product of a more general “culture.” This 
view can be traced back to the German historical school. At other times law is 
defined (by Positivist legal theory) as a top-down and explicit product of elite 
human agents, connected to “culture” only in the sense that law can actively shape 
cultural notions.  
Both definitions of law are ultimately mixed. The historical school’s view of 
the law as a popular, bottom-up customary phenomenon also includes a role for a 
scholarly professional elite whose task is to organize and develop customary 
law.175 Similarly, at least one modern positivist definition of law, that formulated 
by H.L.A. Hart, ultimately grounds law in a widely shared and implicit social norm 
(the rule of recognition).176  
This jurisprudential ambiguity is, I think, responsible for the ambiguous law 
and society formulations about the causal relationship between law and culture. 
The same ambiguity is ultimately also the reason for the problems that I 
encountered in my two research projects: it is unclear whether taxation generally 
and tax law specifically are repositories of unconscious widely shared notions or 
tools used by identifiable elite actors, or some combination of both. This 
ambiguity, rather than any dearth of sources, is the root of my inability to tell a 
neat causal story.  
So how should we study the cultural history of tax law? I believe that even if 
the sources I studied cannot be used to tell a definitive causal story about outside 
“culture” and its relationship to “law,” we can still study these texts in order to 
map and historicize the legal use of the category “culture” in such texts—we can 
try to find out who were the actors (economic and administrative experts, lawyers 
 
Discourse: A Rhetorical Analysis, 28 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 205 (1997) (a quantitative analysis of the use of 
the term “tyranny” and related terms in American case law). 
175. See SAVIGNY, supra note 172, at 28. 
176. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW at vii, 100, 123 (2d ed. 1997). 
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and judges, politicians and government officials) who used such arguments; what 
were the stages in the life of the law (for example the preenactment, enactment, 
application, abolition of tax law) in which these arguments were used; what 
alternative terms (“constitution,” “morality,” “habits,” “custom,” “culture”) 
functioned in the same way in arguments about taxation in different places and 
different times and what caused the shift from one term to another (why was 
“constitution” used in early nineteenth-century England in the same way that 
“culture” or “tradition” was used in twentieth- and twenty-first-century Palestine 
and Israel);177 what did the term “culture” or related terms encompass; and what 
types of sources and analogies were used in the argument (think for example of 
the comparison of income taxation to biblical tithes found in the tax privacy 
debate). We need not only focus on trying to find how law reflects culture, or how 
culture was constituted by law, or some combination of the two—we can also ask 
when and how was the rhetorical move “the tax is not appropriate because it does 
not fit long-standing and widely shared traditions” used in tax-law-related 
debates.178 
Mapping the ways in which the “cultural move” was rhetorically used by 
different actors might lead to new insights about the nature of tax law and lawyers 
and judges dealing with it. For example, we might ask why lawyers in Mandatory 
Palestine ignored arguments about cultural difference. Perhaps the lawyers’ 
attempts to ignore difference is related to the nature of legal discourse—law being 
a way of simplifying reality, ignoring its complexity, and applying the same rules to 
events which are different in order to reach the same results (analogy and 
precedent seem to be two major legal tools to do so). This, obviously, is 
inaccurate. While judges and lawyers involved in projects of legal transplantation 
do sometimes ignore local culture, that is not always the case. Indeed, even the 
legal history of Mandatory Palestine provides examples in which British judges 
and lawyers used “cultural” arguments to reject the transplantation of English 
contract or tort norms.179 If this is indeed the case, however, then we can ask what 
made judges and lawyers think of tax law as more universal and non-culturally 
specific than other areas of law.  
As we can see from the example with which I began this Article, tax lawyers 
do not always ignore culture. In the Abu-Hatsera case, which opened this Article, a 
lawyer used a cultural argument to support the case of a client attempting to 
 
177. One important example of the type of questions that can be asked when using such an 
approach can be found in BIRLA, supra note 10 (historicizing the emergence of “culture” as a distinct 
sphere (and a distinct type of legal argument and distinction) in the late nineteenth-century Indian 
context). 
178. Note that I am not arguing that “law” has no causal relationship to its “outside” (on this 
type of argument see, for example, Gordon, supra note 17, at 88–93). It may well be that law and 
society have some sort of causal relationship. My argument is simply that in addition to trying to 
discover this relationship, it is interesting to focus on noncausal aspects of the history of law. 
179. See ASSAF LIKHOVSKI, LAW AND IDENTITY IN MANDATE PALESTINE 61–83 (2006).  
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escape taxation. What conditions, legal or otherwise, allowed him to use such an 
argument? One might speculate that in the Israeli case at least, the appearance of 
cultural arguments in law may have been related both to “internal” legal changes 
(the decline of formalism in Israeli law between the 1950s and the present) and 
“external” ideological ones (a decline of the melting-pot ideology which 
characterized the early Israeli state in the 1950s and its replacement by a 
multicultural world view in the last two decades).180  
The nineteenth-century British example is different than the twentieth-
century Palestinian one because the participants in the debates did not include 
professional lawyers. One reason for this difference may be the different types of 
sources used. However, the difference may also be an indication of the growing 
role of lawyers (and law) in debates about tax matters between the early 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century, tax law and tax administration becoming the 
domain of legal experts rather than of politicians or ordinary taxpayers.181 
Proceeding from the nineteenth-century British example to the early 
twentieth-century Palestine one and finally to the twenty-first-century miracle-
working rabbi case with which I began this Article, we see at first laypersons 
(using “constitution”) as an argument against income taxation, then officials and 
experts (using “culture”) as an argument and ending with a lawyer (using 
“tradition”) as an argument. This trajectory may merely be the result of chance 
(and of the different types of conflicts involved in each of the three cases), but 
one might also use it to historicize the use of cultural arguments, finding in this 
trajectory, perhaps, an indication of the growing power of lawyers, and the 
growing power of law, as it gradually emerged as a major arena for the discussion 
of the nature of society and its practices, including taxation, in the twentieth 
century.  
The points that I made here are just speculations. I hope, however, that the 
case studies I described in this Article show the desirability of adding a layer of 
rhetorical analysis to the traditional causal approaches of studying the histories of 
tax law and culture. The causal approaches should, of course, not be abandoned, 
but we should warn ourselves that sometimes when we use tax history to discover 
“the spirit of a people,” we may be merely chasing ghosts. 
 
 
180. See generally MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL (2011). 
181. The growing importance of law can also be found in the fact that until the late 
nineteenth century income tax disputes were viewed in the UK as an administrative rather than as a 
legal matter. See generally V. Grout & B. Sabine, The First Hundred Years of Tax Cases, 1975 BRIT. TAX 
REV. 75. See also R. Cocks, Victorian Barristers, Judges and Taxation: A Study in the Expansion of Legal 
Work, in LAW, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND, 1750–1914: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAW 445, 446 (G.R. Rubin & D. Sugarman eds., 1984); Chantal Stebbings, Income Tax 
Tribunals: Their Influence and Place in the Victorian Legal System, in STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF TAX LAW 
57 (John Tiley ed., 2004). 
